DEMOCRATIZING THE JAPANESE FAMILY:
The Role of the Civil Information and Education Section in the Allied Occupation 1945–1952

YUKA (MORIGUCHI) TSUCHIYA
Hiroshima University

INTRODUCTION

The Allied occupation (1945–1952) left Japan significantly influenced by the United States in all aspects of life. In particular, dissemination of the idea of "the democratic family" dramatically changed the traditional concept of the Japanese family, causing significant changes in the domestic life of women. This paper will explore how the American occupation authorities tried to democratize the Japanese family, how and why they tried to uplift Japanese women's status in particular, and how some of the Japanese cooperated with them.

Concerning the above-mentioned topic, Yoda Seiichi presented a thesis that the occupation authorities tried to democratize the Japanese family and to emancipate Japanese women only in accordance with the geopolitical objectives of the occupation, in other words, only in so far as American national interests required. What he meant by American national interests was to transform Japan into a democratic, but weak, harmless country so that it would not emerge as a military or economic rival to the United States. Various anti-democratic, or anti-egalitarian conditions in Japanese society, including the extremely low status of...
women, had to be removed in order to achieve the above-mentioned goal, but not necessarily for the sake of Japanese women. Therefore, Yoda concluded, the priority of policies concerning Japanese women was not high, and they had certain limitations from the beginning.  

Susan Pharr later revised Yoda's thesis by revealing a strong alliance between American women serving in the occupation and a group of Japanese women leaders. Pharr explained that a combination of "bureaucratic policies within the occupation administrative structure" and "the role played by Japanese women leaders as advocates of reform" gave rise to "radical" reform in women's rights, in spite of opposition from high-ranking occupation personnel and from Japanese officials. Uemura Chikako's recent study further explored the influence of American feminist ideology on the occupation policies in Japan. Ethel Weed, a key figure in the development of occupation policies concerning Japanese women received constant advice from the American historian, Mary Beard. Beard advised Weed to help Japanese women by forming a bloc of Japanese and American women. Uemura concluded that the goals Weed pursued, following Beard's advice, derived from the American feminist movement.  

This paper basically supports Pharr's notion that the reform turned out to be radical and far-reaching. However, it will underscore the fact that the emancipation of women did not exist as a goal by itself, independently from other occupation policies, but that it was part of the larger "reorientation policy." More concretely, the emancipation of women had special relevance to the "democratization of the family" pursued by the occupation authorities. "Democratization of the family" consisted of two important aspects. One was the revision of the family law, which resulted in dramatic improvement in Japanese women's legal status. The other was the dissemination of the "spirit" of the new family law to the Japanese people. Naturally, the main elements of this "spirit" were the equal legal rights of women, and the "democratic family" as the antithesis of the traditional patriarchal, authoritarian family system.  

Very little has been written about the occupation policies concerning Japanese women from this perspective. The results of this paper will cast new light on the roles played by the American women serving in the occupation and by their Japanese cooperators. The main primary sources to be used are the records of the GS and CI&E, which belong to Record Group 331, the National Records Center, Suitland, Md., the
United States. Also used are Japanese language magazines which belong to the Gordon G. Prange Collection, University of Maryland at College Park.³

I

DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE IE SYSTEM

The concept of the democratization of the family had special relevance to the revision of the family law carried out in the early Allied occupation period. Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945. The Allied occupation began formally on September 2, and continued until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952. General Douglas MacArthur served concurrently as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and as Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces in the Pacific. The civil affairs organization which he created in his General Headquarters (GHQ) by October 2, which was also known as SCAP, was responsible for carrying out occupation policies toward Japan. The organization included special staff sections such as the Government Section (GS) and the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E).

The ultimate objective of the military occupation of Japan was "to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world," and "to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government." As one of the measures to achieve this objective, the Japanese people were to be "encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights." All the laws which conflicted with this objective were repealed or amended. With regard to the family law, Book IV (Kinship) and Book V (Inheritance) of the 1898 Japanese Civil Code were revised between July 1946 and December 1947. Although the Japanese government carried out the actual drafting of the new Code, it was under the close supervision and instruction of the Government Section (GS), SCAP.⁴

Japan's first modern family law (the 1898 Civil Code) was built on the basis of the "ie system," the family system typical in the ruling class of premodern Japan. Under this system, authority was concentrated in the role (if not the person) of the head of the household (koshu), a position usually occupied by the eldest living male. The koshu might be
considered to be equivalent to a household manager, who supervised the daily activities of the *ie* and who represented the *ie* in the larger community. Although he had ultimate authority over other *ie* members, his decisions should be made in the best interest of the *ie* as a whole. Women played a distinctly subordinate role in the *ie* system. The wife of the *koshu*, as well as the designated successor’s wife, had specific responsibilities and realms of authority. However, the wife’s authority lacked the legal legitimacy of the husband’s. Under the 1898 Civil Code, a woman was regarded as only quasi-competent legally, and she was required to secure her husband’s permission to enter into important legal relationships of any kind.\(^5\)

The new Civil Code, enforced on January 1, 1948, removed the entire legal basis of the *ie*, guaranteeing the rights (if not the practice) of sexual equality, equal inheritance by all children, and freedom of marital and occupational choice. In short, the individual rather than the *ie* was given legal recognition as the basic social unit.\(^6\) While creating a democratic law to govern the Japanese family on the one hand, SCAP tried, on the other hand, to promote the essence of the new Civil Code widely among the Japanese population. This task was carried out by the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) of SCAP.

II

MISSION AND LEADING PERSONNEL OF CI&E

CI&E’s former body, the Information Dissemination Section (IDS) of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), was set up on August 27, 1945, under Brigadier General Bonner Fellers. Fellers had been MacArthur’s military secretary and head of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of AFPAC. IDS started with “a handful of veteran psychological warfare and information officers” from the former PWB and OWI (the Office of War Information), who knew prewar Japan quite well. Its objectives were, as defined by Fellers, the preparation of programs for the Japanese press and radio, the provision of films for release through a central exchange, and the outlining of new courses in liberal government for schools.\(^7\)

MacArthur established CI&E on September 22, 1945, on the basis of IDS, but he put more emphasis on thought reform of the Japanese people. He further reestablished CI&E on October 2, without change
of mission, when he set up GHQ, SCAP. According to General Order No.4 of October 2, CI&E’s objectives were, in sum, to make recommendations about disseminating democratic ideals and principles through all media of public information; making clear to the Japanese public the facts of defeat and war guilt; making the Japanese public understand all SCAP policies and plans; maintaining liaison with the Japanese Ministry of Information, Ministry of Education, mass media, religious, political and other organizations; surveying public opinion; and eliminating militarism and ultra-nationalism from the Japanese educational system. In other words, its mission was to create a ‘‘psychological basis for democracy’’ in Japanese minds to support the SCAP policies.8

The mission of CI&E had a special relevance to Washington’s policy paper series SWNCC 162, which emphasized the importance of reorientating the Japanese through information control. It was first proposed by an SWNCC Navy member, Artemus Gates, on July 19, 1945, though it did not arrive in SCAP as guidance until January 8, 1946 (SWNCC 162/2). SWNCC 162/2 emphasized the importance of long-range programs for the reorientation and reeducation of the Japanese. For successful reorientation, the report recommended reeducating the whole Japanese population, utilizing influential Japanese leaders, as well as all appropriate media, including books, textbooks, periodicals, motion pictures, radio, lectures, discussion groups and schools.9

The first Chief of CI&E was Colonel Kermit (Kenneth) R. Dyke, soon promoted to Brigadier General. Dyke was vice-president for promotion and research at the NBC radio broadcasting system, specializing in advertising, before Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, he first worked for the OWI, and in 1943, joined MacArthur’s headquarters in the Southwest Pacific as head of troop information and education. His mission there was to bolster the morale of American soldiers. In May 1946, Dyke was succeeded by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Nugent, who served in the position until the conclusion of the occupation. Nugent had studied East Asian history and education in the graduate school at Stanford University, receiving an M.A. in 1936. Then he taught English in prewar Japan, while learning the Japanese language. After Pearl Harbor, he served in the Pacific War as a marine intelligence/psychological warfare officer.10

To conclude, the origin, the mission, and backgrounds of the leading personnel of CI&E altogether imply that the reorientation
policy of SCAP, and of CI&E in particular, was essentially the "extension of propaganda and psychological warfare into the peacetime era." This fact partly explains why democratic ideals were disseminated by CI&E so eagerly and effectively among the Japanese, as will be shown in later sections in this paper. Also, the facts mentioned in this section indicate that democratization programs in the early occupation period were not planned by certain reform-minded Americans in SCAP—so-called New Dealers—but that they were part of a reorientation policy worked out in Washington. Washington did not give instructions about detailed democratization programs, such as the democratization of the Japanese family or the improvement of women's legal rights. However, SCAP carried out these programs as part of the reorientation policy, in their effort to remove antidemocratic practices from Japanese society.

III

THE ROLE OF ETHEL WEADE, WOMEN'S INFORMATION OFFICER

Following its establishment in 1945, CI&E went through some organizational changes. In May 1946, six Divisions were created: Administration, Education, Religion, Information, Analysis and Research, and Arts and Historical Monuments. The Information Division, where programs concerning the democratization of the family and the improvement of women's status were mainly worked out, consisted of six Units, such as Policy & Programs, Press & Publications, Motion Pictures, and Radio Broadcasting. Under the Policy & Programs Unit of the Information Division, WAC (Women's Army Corps) Lieutenant Ethel Weed was assigned as Women's Information Officer (WIO). Weed worked like a "dynamo of tireless energy," in the words of one American observer, in promoting women's suffrage, enhancing the development of women's organizations, helping to uplift women's legal status, contributing to the establishment of a Women's and Minors' Bureau in the Ministry of Labor, and making numerous other educational programs for women.

An important part of CI&E activities was to find friendly or cooperative Japanese who would assist in carrying out its mission. In fact, the CI&E's former body, IDS, had already started to make con-
contact with such Japanese. As already mentioned, IDS mostly consisted of former OWI and PWB officers, many of whom believed there were democratic elements in prewar Japan. SWNCC 162/2 clearly restated this policy:

There are numerous Japanese who, through prior contacts and earlier education, will be disposed to accept and assist in the development of our ultimate objectives and along lines which will further the interests of the United States. For this reason a fundamental responsibility of the Allied authorities in Japan should be to seek out such persons, ensure that they are placed in positions that will enable them to accomplish these aims, and afford them counsel, guidance and support.

Women leaders from the prewar years were not exceptions to this policy. Kato Shizue, a pioneer in the birth control movement and a socialist feminist from prewar years, was one of the Japanese thus contacted. According to Kato, her autobiography, Facing Two Ways (first published in 1935 in New York), had been read before the occupation by some officers who would later serve in SCAP. Not knowing that, she was surprised when an American army jeep stopped in front of her house in October 1945. She and her husband Kato Kanju were taken to General Headquarters and interviewed by a CI&E officer. Kanju was asked about labor problems, and Shizue about women’s problems. After that, Kato Shizue kept in close contact with CI&E, and particularly developed close ties with Ethel Weed.

In late 1945 and in early 1946, Kato Shizue recommended two young Japanese women, Kabashima Toshiko and Takahashi (Tomita) Nobuko, to work as Weed’s assistants. Kabashima was a graduate of Tsuda College, and Takahashi was a graduate of Tokyo Woman’s Christian College. Ito (Kawakita) Kazuko, also a graduate of Tsuda College, became one of Weed’s assistants, too, with an introduction from a doctor working for GHQ.

In the Information Division of CI&E, these three women were more than just “assistants.” Aside from translating, interpreting and collecting information for Weed, they provided their knowledge as well as opinions about various women’s problems. According to Takahashi, Weed was honest in admitting that she was unfamiliar with Japanese women’s history, and she earnestly studied to make up for this deficiency. Accordingly, the three women also studied very hard and provided Weed with as much information as possible. Weed was good at giving
her staff a "feeling of participation" and extracting information and ideas from them. Because Weed thus obtained substantial information about various aspects of Japanese society, Takahashi believed, she had the power to make persuasive arguments with other sections concerning SCAP policies on women.¹⁹

To her brain trust inside CI&E, Weed added a think tank outside SCAP. One of the important ways in which CI&E disseminated democratic ideas among the Japanese was by assisting in the development of democratic organizations. Weed took the initiative in establishing the Women's Democratic Club as a "model" women's organization. Through this vehicle, she came into contact with many of the prewar women's leaders, including Miyamoto Yuriko, Sata Ineko, Hani Setsuko, Yamamura Tamiko, Kushida Fuki, Matsuoka Yoko, Akamatsu Tsuneko, and Kawasaki Natsu. Kato Shizue was also a member. These members were a mixture of a wide variety of women, from leftist to conservative, and represented several professions. The Women's Democratic Club later split because of ideological differences among Marxist, liberal and conservative members, and the club increasingly assumed a leftist tone. Nonetheless, the fact that major prewar feminist leaders were at least once connected to Weed was significant, in the sense that they created a basis of unity for various common goals, including Civil Code reform. The network of these women leaders surrounding Weed was maintained throughout the occupation, and Weed consulted them on various occasions.²⁰

With regard to the democratization of the family and Civil Code reform, Weed started her work as early as late 1945. On December 28, 1945, she participated in the first meeting with representatives of other sections to discuss the necessity of revising the existing Code.²¹

On March 11, 1946, Weed and her fellow CI&E officers completed an extensive "special report" entitled "Women's Legal Status in Japan." The report started with an introduction declaring that "women would never achieve real equality until the discriminative articles of the Civil and Criminal Codes are erased." Next, the report briefly explained the history of the Civil and Criminal Codes and the unsuccessful attempt at revisions in 1925. It further listed the provisions of the present Civil and Criminal Codes affecting women.²² After the publication of the report, CI&E increasingly expanded its activities for the democratization of the family and uplifting of women's legal status.
DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAMS

(1) Media Guidance

Weed made an effort to emphasize the necessity of Civil Code reform through the media. Since September 1945, CI&E had been supporting various radio programs as part of their mission to spread democratic ideas. Although the programs were broadcast by the Japanese National Broadcasting Agency (NHK or Nippon Hosō Kyokai), they were under the close supervision of CI&E. The media control carried out by SCAP was twofold: the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) of the Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, precensored radio programs until mid or late 1947, while CI&E provided guidance as to contents. The former eliminated material it considered to be against the interests of the occupation forces, while the latter strengthened the democratic and pro-American tendencies in the programs.

One of these programs, “Women’s Hour,” was a one-hour session dealing with various women’s problems, including the ie system and Civil Code reform. On May 13, 1946, for example, “Women’s Hour” sponsored a round-table discussion entitled “On the Emancipation of Women and the Civil Law.” The discussion was chaired by Saito Eizaburo, a newspaperman who later became a Dietman, with four women law specialists as speakers. All of the participants agreed on the need to abolish the ie system. One of the speakers, Watanabe Michiko, then a probationary attorney, emphasized that family life should be based on the cooperation of husband and wife, rather than the ie system. She also proposed the establishment of “special courts for family troubles.” Her suggestion later became reality with the establishment of the Family Court in early 1948, and Watanabe herself became an arbitrator there.

The script for this discussion was carefully checked, although it is not clear whether this examination was carried out by CCD or CI&E. The script was found in one of the CI&E files. Watanabe’s comments were underlined most frequently. In the eyes of SCAP officers, Watanabe seemed to be a model collaborator who would work for the democratization of the Japanese family. She soon became a lawyer, and remained one of CI&E’s most important advisers.
On August 26, 1946, Weed arranged a meeting between Kawashima Takeyoshi, a member of the governmental committee for drafting a new Civil Code, and Mrs. Edgers from the Radio Unit, CI&E Information Division. Kawashima was an enthusiastic advocate for complete abolition of the *ie* system, and his opinions were winning strong support from Weed and other SCAP officers involved in Civil Code reform. This was just when heated discussion erupted between conservatives and liberals in the Japanese governmental committee as to whether or not to abolish the *ie* system completely. In his meeting with Edgers, Kawashima emphasized the necessity of interpreting the draft Civil Code to the public in order to keep them abreast of the changes. As a result, a series of special "Women’s Hour" programs on Civil Code reform was arranged.

It is noteworthy that there were some Japanese women collaborating in the promotion of "Women’s Hour." Egami Fuji, Chief of the Women’s Division at NHK, was then producing several radio programs including "Women’s Hour." In the September 1947 issue of a progressive women’s magazine, *Fujin no Seiki*, Egami talked about her effort to democratize the Japanese family through radio programs. She referred to the undemocratic and unequal customs remaining in the Japanese family, such as sending sons to the universities, but not daughters. Egami keenly felt the necessity to enlighten Japanese women, and had decided to target in particular women who had received more than a high school education, who formed about twenty percent of the female population. She further mentioned in the magazine her specific efforts on "Women’s Hour" to teach listeners how to organize women’s groups. She said that she often consulted Ethel Weed about this topic. In her November 1949 discussion with women leaders in another women’s magazine, *Fujin Koron*, Egami reported that she had received an increasing number of letters with questions and suggestions from radio listeners, and a survey she conducted showed that "Women’s Hour" was heard by a wide range of Japanese women.

In June 1946, CI&E developed another radio series called "What’s Your Problem?" Lawyer Tanabe Shigeko was one of the seven guest speakers who appeared on the program in rotation; she was to discuss the position of women in the family. Tanabe became another important adviser to CI&E.

Beginning in the spring of 1947, GS and CI&E cooperated with each
other in developing a number of special education programs relating to
the Civil Code. A series of thirty-four radio programs were developed,
illustrating basic provisions of the revised Code and contrasting new
provisions with the old. They were broadcast between September and
December 1947, under various titles, including “Women’s Hour,”
“Farmers’ Hour,” “Radio Interviews,” and “Voices on the Street.”
“Individual dignity” and the “essential equality of sexes” as provided
for in the new constitution was always the keynote stressed in the pro-
grams.31

In the field of magazines, the CI&E Analysis and Research Division
frequently carried out publication analyses on various topics. In this
way, CI&E could be well informed about the thoughts of many
Japanese intellectuals at that time, and could consequently know who
might be cooperative with SCAP. Seven issues of publication analyses
dealt with women’s problems between February 1946 and May 1948. In
particular, the May 9, 1946 issue centered on the problem of the
democratization of the family. Its introduction summarized CI&E’s ap-
proach to the problem:

This report deals with the elements of feudalism in the family system,
with the resultant legal inequalities. . . . Indeed, it is a matter of grave
doubt whether democratic, educational, and political reforms can take deep
root as long as Japanese family life remains locked in the grip of feudalism
and authoritarianism. Conversely, a sense of individuality and respect for
the rights and dignity of the individual within the family can do much to
help Japan along its avowed path toward democracy.32

The report went on to summarize and comment on the opinions of
Nakagawa Zennosuke and Wagatsuma Sakae, the most influential
figures in the Japanese governmental committee for drafting the new
Civil Code. However, they were much less progressive than
Kawashima Takeyoshi, a younger member of the committee, as to the
democratization of the family.33 Therefore, the report was critical of
Nakagawa and Wagatsuma’s opinion that, if the ie system were to be
made less extreme in its paternalism, it would then be able to survive
under democracy.

While analyzing the actual output of magazines, CI&E was at the
same time instructing Japanese women’s magazines as to what kind of
articles they should carry. On September 5, 1946, Ethel Weed and Cap-
tain Marian Mitchell gathered together representatives of various
women’s magazines. Emphasizing the tremendous educational role of newspapers and magazines, Weed urged them to run features and stories promoting the participation of women in the forthcoming local elections. Mitchell gave examples of interesting features from some unnamed magazines, such as “a round-table discussion by five farm women on the emancipation of farm women” or “women’s club pages.”

In addition to guidance for radio broadcasting and magazines, CI&E provided various kinds of pamphlets, exhibits, films and drama scripts to educate Japanese women in ways to democratize their family. Some of these materials were sent from Washington by the Reorientation Branch, Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department, and others were prepared in Japan by CI&E. For example, there was a film strip entitled “New Legal Rights of Women under the Civil Code” and a film “the Family Is a Little World (Microcosm),” which contrasted Japanese family life with that of Western nations, emphasizing the importance of cooperation and the comradeship of husband and wife.

Another film, “Towards a Better Life” (May 1949), was a 24 minute film introducing the prewar Japanese feminist movement, the history of the ie system, the history of women in the labor force, and the principle of equality of men and women as stipulated in the new constitution. The script of the film was handed to Japanese feminist leaders including Hiratsuka Akiko, Tomita Nobuko, and Yamakawa Kikue, who were then asked to comment on it. The script was revised several times in accordance with their advice.

(2) Field Trips

As an important part of her duties, Ethel Weed made many field trips in order to hold conferences with local women leaders. She made at least fourteen trips between 1946 and 1949, covering almost all parts of the four islands of Japan. In addition, other information officers in CI&E sometimes made similar field trips, substituting for Weed.

Weed’s lectures and discussions covered various topics, including women’s organizations, suffrage, legal status, and land reform. For specific topics, such as the Civil Code or land reform, she invited specialists to speak. At least one of her three Japanese assistants always accompanied her as an interpreter. Sometimes Weed’s network of Japanese women helped her to arrange trips. For example, Miyamoto
Yuriko, a famous communist writer and novelist whom Weed knew through the Women’s Democratic Club, introduced her to local people or gave her advice about an itinerary on some occasions. Miyamoto described Weed as “an unprejudiced, honest, warm-hearted woman.”

Local newspapers always carried articles about Weed’s lectures and discussions, and often sponsored the conferences.

The main purpose of her trips early in 1946 was to encourage women to vote in the general election scheduled for the coming April, in which Japanese women exercised their suffrage right for the first time in their history. After the election was over, the main focus of the field trips shifted toward helping democratize local women’s organizations through lectures and discussions. The period from late 1946 to early 1947 was probably the busiest for the Women’s Affairs Unit. Weed completed a series of meetings with a total of about 5,000 women in southern Honshu (the main island), Shikoku (an island in western Japan), and Kyushu (an island in southern Japan), covering a distance of approximately 2,500 miles in the period between December 7 and December 23. On January 15 and 16, Weed and Lulu Holmes, Adviser on Women’s Education, CI&E, conducted a conference attended by 818 women leaders in Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Honshu. Assistant WIO Maryellen Glerum also made a field trip to several prefectures in central Honshu in January.

In 1947, Civil Code reform became one of the most important topics discussed at these conferences. It was typical of the field trips of this period that Japanese lawyers cooperated with Weed in giving explanations of women’s rights in relation to the Civil Code. From June 9 through 13, Weed went on a field trip to Niigata and Yamagata Prefectures in northeastern Honshu, accompanied by lawyer Watanabe Michiko, who gave a speech in Yamagata on the “Proposed Revisions in the Civil Code.” A discussion with twenty women was held on the same topic. On June 26 and 27, a similar program was repeated in Hokkaido.

Weed and lawyer Tanabe Shigeko took a field trip to Shimane Prefecture in western Honshu from July 25 through August 6, 1947. Women representatives from nearby Okayama and Tottori Prefectures also participated in the meetings held there. Tanabe gave a two-hour lecture during this tour on the new status of women under the revised Civil Code. The lecture was followed by a question and answer session. The record of the session prepared by CI&E cited one Japanese woman ask-
ing, "Who takes care of wives in their second marriages when they get old, while no legal relationship exists between such wives and their step children under the new Civil Code?" The record also cited a serious personal problem raised by another Japanese woman. Her husband had a mistress and came back to her village only once a year to see her children. Her question was what she could do under the new Civil Code. No answers to these questions were recorded. These questions suggest that ordinary Japanese women, unfamiliar with laws, could only discuss the new Civil Code superficially, although they were very much interested in it.

After the session, a discussion was held with women leaders, representatives of the sponsoring newspaper company, and Ethel Weed. The main points of the discussion on Civil Code reform appeared in a local newspaper. For example, as for the duty of mutual support among family and relatives, Weed had explained that in the United States, it was not a legal problem but a natural expression of love; there was no compulsion of support either by law or by the authority of the head of the house. Then Tanabe criticized the Japanese custom concerning divorce, still widely in practice, in which the wife had to leave her child at her husband's ie against her will. Weed explained the common American practice, whereby it was assumed that the mother would live with the child, while the father supported them economically.

After the conference was over, the participants, mostly representatives of various women's groups, continued to talk until late at night. They were interested in many subjects, and it was a new experience for them to travel far from home and to stay together and share their insights with women from other towns and villages. This suggests that Ethel Weed's field trips had an important effect on local Japanese women leaders by giving them a chance to reflect on the problems they faced, even though they lacked extensive legal knowledge about the Civil Code. Particularly notable is the fact that women "went public" with their problems, which they had not before then regarded as common problems shared by other women.

From August 12 through 15, 1947, Weed made another field trip, this time to Shikoku. Again Civil Code reform was a major topic of the conference, and this time Judge Tamaki of the Tokushima District Court and Judge Ogawa of the Takamatsu District Court gave lectures. Judge Tamaki emphasized that the traditional concept of family
life in Japan was fundamentally undemocratic, and that the Civil Code, as it was based on such a concept, should be revised.\textsuperscript{45}

With regard to those field trips, the contribution of local military teams should not be ignored. In terms of the original military government organization of AFPAC, eight regional military government (MG) headquarters were placed under the United States Eighth Army, the main force of the occupation. Furthermore, some local MG teams were placed under each MG headquarters. The Eighth Army Headquarters in Yokohama, as well as local MG teams and headquarters, had Women’s Affairs Officers.\textsuperscript{46} In most cases, CI&E’s programs on women’s affairs were held with the cooperation of the local MG teams’ Women’s Affairs Officers. CI&E instructed local Women’s Affairs Officers on the objectives and methods of reorientation through Eighth Army Headquarters, and provided them with the necessary materials and information. In return, the local officers reported their activities every month to Emily Hathaway, the Eighth Army Women’s Affairs Officer, who compiled the reports and submitted them to CI&E.\textsuperscript{47}

The local Women’s Affairs Officers had direct contact with grassroots Japanese women, and their influence on Japanese women must have been significant. Carmen Johnson, a Women’s Information Officer with the Shikoku MG headquarters, tells of her experiences in her book \textit{Senryyo Nikki: Kusanone no Onnatachi} [Occupation Journal: Women at the Grassroots]. From her arrival in Shikoku in August 1947 until she left Japan in February 1951, she conducted hundreds of lectures, discussions, and interviews with local government officials, women’s organization leaders, housewives, farmers, and students. She even visited very small villages, talking with local men and women about the concepts of freedom and democracy.

Johnson had to confront various customs which discriminated against women. For example, in some meetings, only men sat on chairs, while women stood in the corners of the room. Also, the leaders of local women’s organizations were invariably the same people as those who had been used by authorities in wartime organizations for the mobilization of the home front. Johnson patiently explained to them that they should form women’s organizations based on their own needs and interests, and elect leaders through a democratic procedure. She persuaded herself that, if she could instill ideas of freedom and democracy in the heart of just one female official in one prefecture, something would remain even after she left Japan.\textsuperscript{48}
In one lecture, to explain how Japanese women could reform the traditional family system, Johnson talked about her childhood. When she related innocent jokes she and her brother had played on their father such as putting a pillow on top of a door so that it would fall down on him when the door was fully opened, or sewing his silverware to the tablecloth, the countryside Japanese women were shocked and frightened. They could not believe that American children could do such horrible things to the head of the family. Then Johnson told the women that her father participated in his children’s practical jokes, even when he could see through them.49

Probably this was the first experience for those women to hear about families in another country. Johnson’s story was perhaps more impressive than any lecture on the Civil Code reform or democratization of the family to ordinary women in the rural areas. Although the story might not have brought any immediate change in their family relations, at least it might have led some women to realize there could be other, better forms of family.

(3) Information Activities by Japanese People

It should not be forgotten that there were at the same time some grassroots activities undertaken by Japanese people to spread the idea of the democratization of the family and to emphasize the necessity of abolishing the ie system.

In January 1946, in Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan, a local man named Kawata Masataka wrote a seven-page pamphlet entitled “Appeal to Women.” This was many months before the Japanese government undertook Civil Code reform. In the pamphlet he emphasized the importance of making women aware of national social problems in reconstructing Japan. As a first step, he claimed, the ie system had to be abolished and the Civil Code be revised. This pamphlet was acquired by CI&E, although it is not known whether they used it for any purpose or project.50

In Kagoshima Prefecture, the southernmost rural region, Nakayama Tomekichi, a primary school teacher, wrote a drama in 1949 called “Mezameyuku Ie” [Awakening Home], with the subtitle “home democratization drama.” Members of a local women’s group performed in it. A CI&E officer who saw the script obtained permission from the author for its reproduction and use for educational purposes. The drama consisted of three parts. The first part described an oppres-
sive traditional *ie*, where the wife was deprived of all human rights and dignity, a style of family which was still in a large part the reality in rural villages. The second part was a comedy about a family which had misunderstood the meaning of freedom and democracy, and which went to extremes, neglecting harmony within the family and worshiping individualism and American culture. The third part illustrated the ideal democratic family in which everyone had human rights and dignity, while there was also harmony and coordination.\(^\text{51}\) It is impressive that many ordinary people in local villages were struggling to find a new, ideal style of family which could replace the traditional *ie* system.

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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE FAMILY**

(1) The Reasons for Radical Reform

From what has been discussed in the previous sections, it can be concluded that the policies CI&E carried out in order to uplift Japanese women’s legal and social status were far-reaching and often had important effects on Japanese ways of thinking. These policies were radical, in the sense that they aimed at revolutionary changes in Japanese ethics, particularly concerning the family, the most private and basic sphere of life. There were several reasons for this radical reform.

First, as explained in section II, CI&E was in its origin an agency for thought control, and its mission was the reorientation and reeducation of the Japanese, and therefore, it is understandable that CI&E tried to bring about radical changes in the Japanese way of thinking. The emancipation of Japanese women was also part of this reorientation and reeducation, even though each American involved was trying to help Japanese women out of sympathy and good will. Radical reform in the Japanese mentality was necessary, from the American point of view, in order to democratize Japan so that it would never again be a menace to the peace of the world.

Secondly, the warm welcome and support by some Japanese people accelerated the speed of reform. These people were those who had been oppressed in the prewar social systems, and many of them were women. Some of these people had been pioneers in the movements for democracy, freedom, and feminism during the 1920s, although such
movements had been completely suppressed by the Japanese government in the 1930s. Americans knew of the existence of these pioneers, and had planned to make use of them as their allies. CI&E also found supporters among the younger generation, who were ready to accept progressive ideas about family and women.

According to lawyer Watanabe Michiko, who was one of Weed’s most reliable “brains,” there was a high level of cooperation between Weed and Japanese feminists. This was mainly because Weed never tried to impose her own ideas upon them. Rather, she gathered Japanese women’s hopes and ideas and put them into practice in various democratization programs. Weed’s collaborators, including Watanabe, trusted her because of her selfless devotion to the improvement of Japanese women’s legal and social status. This explanation apparently contradicts the thesis that the emancipation of women was part of the reeducation of the Japanese. However, it was actually quite natural that two groups with common interests—American reformers and reform-minded Japanese women—should form a strong alliance. In fact, Weed sometimes took a firm stance against the conservative male members of the governmental committee for drafting the new Civil Code. She studied carefully each article of the Code affecting women, obviously with the assistance of her think tank consisting of Japanese women, and checked some male committee members’ attempts to retain elements of the ie system. Some of the committee members, not only extreme conservatives but even some moderates, apparently had some negative feelings about Weed as a result.

The Japanese women who supported Weed in various ways were united on one point: the abolition of the ie system. Legal professionals, such as Watanabe Michiko and Tanabe Shigeko, feminists with socialist leanings including Kato Shizue, or communists such as Miyamoto Yuriko, all agreed on removing the legal authority of the head of the family and winning equal legal rights for women, although they sometimes had different opinions about detailed stipulations of the Civil Code.

Finally, there was another, unexpected reason for radical reform. American women serving in SCAP, such as Weed and Johnson, went far beyond what the occupation policy required in their work to uplift Japanese women’s status. There were only vague, abstract ideas about women’s rights in the occupation policies originally. The only time women’s rights were mentioned by top-ranking occupation personnel
was on October 11, 1945, when MacAuthur included "liberation of Japanese women by franchization" in his five instructions to the Japanese government concerning required reforms under the occupation. In contrast, what Weed, Johnson, and other Americans carried out for Japanese women was much more concrete and far-reaching. What urged them to do this? Maybe there was a sense of being "missionaries of democracy," as Johnson put it. However, it is possible to speculate that another reason had much to do with the status of American women in their own country.

In the United States, as soldiers came back from overseas and began to seek jobs, women who had worked in wartime factories were forced out of the job market. The average age of marriage in the United States dropped significantly, and the birth rate rose from the late 1940s to the 1950s, although this tendency had class and race differences. Magazine articles urged women to get married early and to engage in full-time housekeeping. The overall atmosphere of American society was against working women, even though many American women actually stayed in the work force in spite of the pressure.

Weed, Johnson, and some other female American officers were far more advanced in their reform-oriented, society-oriented thinking than the average American woman in the late 1940s. Both Weed and Johnson were pioneer WACs and had plenty of experience in social work. It is thus possible to speculate that they tried to realize in Japan the equal rights that American women had not yet achieved in their country.

(2) Significance of the Abolition of the Ie System

As mentioned before, the emancipation of women was closely related to the democratization of the family. Americans thought the roots of militarism lay in Japanese family life. This view of the ie system had some truth in it. The ie system, however, was (and is still) a rather complicated concept. It had legal, moral, and social aspects. SCAP tried to eradicate all these aspects from Japanese society.

With regard to women’s rights, the legal aspect of the ie system contained the sexual inequality and primogeniture which was institutionalized in the 1898 Civil Code. It was truly meaningful that these legal inequalities were removed by Civil Code reform during the Allied occupation. The moral aspect of the ie system derived from the Neo-Confucian view of the family as a hierarchically ordered unit. Accord-
ing to this view, children’s respect for their parents (fathers in particular) and women’s obedience to men were regarded as important moral codes. These family ethics were generally observed by the ruling class in premodern Japan. The Meiji government (1868–1912), keenly feeling the necessity to establish a strong, centralized country, spread such moral values into the population at large through education. The government also institutionalized such values in the 1898 Civil Code. The moral ideology of the ie was used by ultra-nationalists from the 1930s throughout the War in the Pacific as propaganda. In the eyes of ultra-nationalists, the ie was a microcosm of the country; as the emperor ruled the country, so the head of the house ruled the family. Removal of the elements of the ie system from the Civil Code in the early occupation period also greatly hindered these ideological connotations of the ie.

The social or customary aspect of the ie system concerned, in essence, unequal, undemocratic practices which Weed and Johnson tried to eradicate through educational programs. However, people’s behavioral patterns were often decided by practical need rather than by ideology. In other words, the customs of the ie system were in some cases convenient for Japanese people regardless of the ideology behind it. For example, the ie system functioned as a social welfare system at a time when the Japanese social welfare system was poor. Without the protection of the head of the family, the poor, the widowed, and the physically weak were particularly vulnerable. SCAP probably did not notice, or did not care about, the positive aspects of the ie system. They tried their best to emancipate women from the oppression of the ie, but did not particularly support the economic independence of those who lost the paternalistic protection that the ie system had provided.

(3) Evaluation of the Reorientation Policy from the Japanese Woman’s Point of View

In spite of the negative point mentioned above, the efforts made by Weed, Johnson, and some other SCAP officers should be highly valued from the Japanese woman’s point of view. Looking back in 1985, Kato Shizue remarked that “We have acquired the present rights because there was external pressure, because we lost the war.” Japanese feminist leaders took advantage of the “momentum” of democratization and equalization created by CI&E to accomplish their ambitions:
suffrage, legal equality, and positions in the central and local governments.

From 1948, the main emphasis of the occupation policy shifted from the democratization of Japan to the rebuilding of the country in order to contain communism and to create a more viable economy. Although this shift was far from the so-called "reverse course," a theory that the United States completely abandoned democratic reforms, Japanese conservatives—an axis of politicians, bureaucrats, and big businessmen—had a chance to regain their momentum. Some of them advocated the revival of the *ie* system.

Some Americans including Weed, who believed in the democratization of Japan and had earnestly worked towards that goal, were very disappointed to see that some of the progressive reforms achieved in the early occupation period, such as the encouragement of labor union activities, were later abandoned by SCAP. However, the purpose of the military occupation was originally to serve the geopolitical interests of the victors of the war. Therefore, when the main emphasis of American interests shifted from the democratization of Japan to the containment of communism, occupation policies also quite naturally changed. What is surprising here, however, is that CI&E and local Women's Affairs Officers continued their work in democratizing the family and promoting women's rights even after 1948, as various examples in section IV have shown. The new Civil Code also survived, in spite of the repeated conservative challenge to revive the *ie* system in the Code. The new Code had been already accepted by the majority of Japanese people by the time the reactionaries gained power.

Today, the majority of Japanese still regard the family as the fundamental unit of society. Women are still largely regarded as caretakers of children and the elderly. However, today's definition of family is decidedly different from that of the prewar *ie*. The investigation made for the present study supports the thesis that Civil Code reform and the dissemination of the idea of the "democratic family" by CI&E played an important role in this change. In fact, legal and social reforms concerning women during the Allied occupation formed an important basis for the rapid progress of Japanese women's rights in later years.
NOTES


3 The Gordon G. Prange Collection consists of books, magazines, and newspapers published in Japan between 1946 and 1949, and collected by the Civil Censorship Detachment of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS). The late Prof. Prange of the University of Maryland, who served in the History Office of CIS, was aware of the importance of those materials and shipped them for preservation and scholarly use to the University of Maryland, College Park.

4 "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC 150/4/A), The Department of State Bulletin 13 (1945): 423. This policy was made public by President Truman on September 22, 1945. The most direct cause of Civil Code reform was the new Japanese constitution, which was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and enforced on May 3, 1947. The constitution included two important articles affecting the legal status of women. Article 14 was an explicit guarantee of women's equality. Article 24 further guaranteed individual dignity and equality of the sexes with regard to marriage, divorce, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family. Susan Pharr points out the contribution of Beate Sirota, a young woman on the staff of the Civil Rights Committee, GS, in including these articles in the present constitution in "A Radical U.S. Experiment: Women's Rights Laws and the Occupation of Japan," in The Occupation of Japan: Impact of Legal Reform (the Proceedings of a Symposium Sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial on April 14–15, 1977), ed. L. H. Redford (Norfolk: MacArthur Memorial, 1977). The process of Civil Code reform will be discussed in another paper of mine, "Civil Code Reform in Occupied Japan 1946–1947" (in preparation).


6 Long, p. 17.


12 Takemae, pp. 117–125. Units were later renamed as Branches. In late 1948, the former Analysis and Research Division was renamed the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division.

13 Ethel Berenice Weed (1906–1975) was born in Syracuse, New York. She attended Western Reserve University, earning an A.B. in English in 1929. After working for eight years as a feature writer at the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* and for five years as an assistant executive secretary for the Women’s City Club, she opened her own office and began handling publicity for various women’s and other civic organizations. In 1943 Weed joined the newly established Women’s Army Corps. She was commissioned as a second lieutenant in August 1944, and was involved in recruiting until 1945. After learning of a course in Japanese studies at Northwestern University to prepare twenty women officers for assignment in Japan after its defeat, she applied for the program and was admitted. After Japan’s surrender Weed and her fellow WACs were dispatched to Japan. When Weed reported to SCAP in October 1945, she was given the title of Women’s Information Officer. Weed continued her activities as WIO until the end of the occupation. Barbara Sicherman and Carol Hurd Green, eds., *Notable American Women: The Modern Period* (New York: Belknap Press, 1980), pp. 721–723.


Ibid., p. 67; Ito Kazuko, telephone interview by author, May 26, 1993. Their maiden names are parenthesized.

19 Takahashi Nobuko, interview by Nishi Kiyoko, in Senryo-ka no Nihon Fujin Seisaku: Sono Rekishi to Shogen, pp. 71–77. Weed’s three assistants were pioneers in various fields after they left CI&E. Takahashi was appointed as the chief of the Women’s and Minors’ Bureau in the Ministry of Labor, which was established with the help of Weed. She went on to become assistant director general of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and later Ambassador to Denmark. Kabashima became a journalist for the Kyodo News Agency and then an advisor in the Netherlands Embassy in Japan. Ito lectured at Tsuda College and later became a lawyer. Takahashi Nobuko, interview by Nishi Kiyoko, pp. 70, 80.

20 Ibid., p. 78. Miyamoto Yuriko was a leftist writer and was married to the chairman of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Sata Ineko was also a leftist writer and a member of the JCP. Hani Setsuko was a social reformer, particularly working for the welfare of mothers and children. Yamamuro Tamiko was a Christian social reformer and a daughter of the founder of the Japanese Salvation Army. Kushida Fuki was a feminist leader who contributed to the postwar coalition of various feminist movements. Matsuoka Yoko was the first president of the Women’s Democratic Club and also worked as a journalist, writer, and translator. Akamatsu Tsuneko was the first chief of the Women’s Section of the Japan Socialist Party. Kawasaki Natsu contributed to the prewar women’s suffrage movement and was at the center of the Women Teachers’ Association. Gendai Jimbutsu Jiten [Who’s Who in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Asahi Newspaper Co., 1977).

21 GS, “Memorandum for the Chief,” Central Files Branch, Miscellaneous File 1945–1951, Box 2142.


24 Ibid., pp. 272, 287, 293, 310, 312.


26 Chief of the Courts and Law Division, GS, Alfred Oppler, who was a key figure in Civil Code reform, reflected, “We had good allies in Japan, and the best ones were the educated Japanese women. Among the most enthusiastic ones were the few Japanese lawyers . . . I remember particularly Miss Watanabe Michiko as an eager feminist.” Alfred Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 189. Watanabe herself emphasizes that she did not mean to cooperate with SCAP, but she just wanted to work for Japanese women in her effort to uplift women’s status. Watanabe Michiko, telephone interview by author, December 13, 1993.

27 Mrs. Edger’s full name could not be identified.


30 CI&E, “For the Record,” Information Division, Policy & Programs Branch, Women’s Affairs Activities 1945–1950, Box 5251.

31 SCAP, GS, Political Reorientation of Japan, vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: Govern-


33 More about the different opinions within the Japanese governmental committee for drafting the new Civil Code will be mentioned in another paper of mine, “Civil Code Reform in Occupied Japan 1946–1947” (in preparation).

34 CI&E, Information Division, Policy & Programs Branch, Women’s Affairs Activities 1945–50, Box 5246. (All the records in Box 5246 belong to CI&E, Information Division, Policy & Programs Branch, Women’s Affairs Activities 1945–50.)

35 Bruno, pp. 185–188.

36 CI&E, Information Division, Policy & Programs Branch, Women’s Affairs Activities 1945–1950, Box 5249.

37 Ibid.

38 CI&E, Letters from Miyamoto Yuriko to Ethel Weed, Miyamoto Yuriko to Ozaki Kuni, Information Division, Policy & Programs Branch, Women’s Affairs Activities 1945–1950, Box 5247.


40 CI&E, “For the Record,” and several newspaper clippings, Box 5246.

41 CI&E, “Memorandum and Intra-Section Memorandum,” Box 5246.

42 CI&E, “Report to Chief, Information Division,” Box 5246.

43 CI&E, “Memorandum,” Box 5246.

44 CI&E, newspaper clipping and its translation, Box 5246.

45 CI&E, “Report on August Trip,” Box 5246. The full names of the two judges could not be identified.

46 AFPAC was called the Far East Command (FECOM) at this point. The title of these officers is inconsistent in SCAP documents. For purposes of clarity, officers in charge of women’s affairs in military governments will hereafter be called “Women’s Affairs Officers.”

47 CI&E, “From Eighth Army Headquarters to Miss Glerum,” Box 5246.

48 Johnson was born in Wisconsin in 1910. After graduating from Northern Illinois State Teachers College, she became a schoolteacher and then a professional worker with the Girl Scouts. In 1942, she joined the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC), which was renamed the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) the following year. After Japan’s defeat, she accepted a clerical position in Japan and arrived in Yokohama in August 1946. While serving with the Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Nagoya she was interviewed by Emily Hathaway and was assigned as a Women’s Affairs Officer to the Shikoku Military Government Region in August 1947. Carmen Johnson, Senryo Nikki: Kusanone no Onnatachi [Occupation Journal: Women at the Grassroots] (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1986); Carmen Johnson, interview by author, Washington D.C., September 10, 1991.


50 CI&E, Information Division, Policy & Programs Branch, Education to Legal Affairs, Box 5248.

51 Ibid.

52 Watanabe Michiko, telephone interview by author, May 30, 1993. Not all Japanese feminists cooperated with SCAP. For example, Ichikawa Fusae, a pioneer in the Japanese women’s suffrage movement, did not respond to the repeated invitations by Weed to visit CI&E. This was apparently because she was preoccupied with many other activities, including the New Japan Women’s League (Shin Nihon Fujin Domei)
which she established in November 1945. She was also rather critical of Weed, because Weed was not a specialist of women’s problems. Having spent two and a half years in the United States in the 1920s, Ichikawa was familiar with not only the Japanese, but also the American feminist movement. However, Ichikawa later gave high marks to the occupation policies toward Japanese women. Dee Ann Vavich, “The Japanese Woman’s Movement: Ichikawa Fusae, a Pioneer in Woman’s Suffrage” in *Monumenta Nipponica* 22 (1967); Ichikawa Fusae, interview by Kodama Katsuko et al., in *Kin-dai Nihon Joseishi eno Shogon* [Testimony for the History of Modern Japanese Women], ed. Rekishi Hyoron Henshu-bu (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppansha, 1979).

53 For more about the friction between Weed and the Japanese committee members, see another paper of mine, “Civil Code Reform in Occupied Japan 1946–1947” (in preparation).

54 Although the Civil Code was drafted by scholars chosen by the Japanese government, SCAP gave Japanese in various fields, including feminist leaders, chances to express their opinions about the Code. Some of the opinions actually had a considerable influence on the process of drafting. One of the points on which feminists’ opinions were split was “whether a couple should get permission from the family court when they divorce.” Tanabe Shigeko, Niizuma Ito, Chief of the Women’s Division, Women’s and Minor’s Bureau, and Hirabayashi Taiko, a Marxist novelist and president of the leftist Democratic Women’s League (*Minshu Fujin Remmei*), advocated permission from the Court as a way of avoiding “ousting divorce,” in which the wife was ostracized from the husband’s house against her will when she was not favored by her husband’s parents. Dietwomen Yamasaki Michiko, Kato Shizue, Matsutani Tenkoko, Fukuda Naoko, Matsuo Toshi, and Toda Satoko disagreed, because they believed that the principle of freedom should apply to divorce, too. Finally, the latter opinion was adopted in the draft Civil Code. Tanabe Shigeko, *Josei no tameno Shim-mimpo* [The New Civil Code for Women] (Tokyo: Keihoku Shobo, 1948), The Prange Collection, pp. 136–137.


58 For more about the spread of the moral values of the *ie* system in the Meiji period, see Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Smith, “Making Village Women into ‘Good Wives and Wise Mothers’ in Prewar Japan.”


60 Kato Shizue, interview by Nishi Kiyoko, p. 69.

61 Ito Kazuko, telephone interview by author, May 27, 1993.