Analyzing ‘Political Space’ Two-Dimensionally: The Notion and Prospects of Interpolitical Relations

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INTRODUCTION

In today’s world, most countries are divided into two or more subnational territorial units, with various names such as provinces, oblasts, cantons, and prefectures. And, regardless of whether the country’s constitutional structure is unitary or federal, there are ‘local,’ or non-central, governments that correspond to and govern these units. While it is almost self-evident that the segmentation of politics, or ‘political space,’ caused by the presence of these subnational units and their governments adds immense complexity to the nature of politics in these nations, there have been surprisingly few efforts to investigate in a systematic fashion the workings of such segmented domestic politics and its effects on political outcomes.

This, unfortunately, is also the case with the United States, even though its federal system has been one of the major subjects of inquiry, especially for political scientists. In this essay, I will make an attempt to deal with this situation by proposing an analytical approach I call ‘interpolitical relations.’ This approach involves a two-dimensional macro image of domestic politics that challenges the conventional image of politics, which is unidimensional and dualistic in the sense I explain below.
The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, I will demonstrate the limits of the conventional image of domestic politics, first by pointing out the conceptual confusion the image contains, and then by reviewing how segmented domestic politics has been studied, especially in the United States. Next, an alternative, two-dimensional interpretation of domestic politics and an analytical framework based on that interpretation, which I call ‘interpolitical relations,’ will be proposed to overcome those limits. In the third section, the structure of U.S. politics in the period between the 1830s and the 1890s, the so-called ‘Partisan era,’ is taken up and analyzed using the approach to show its strengths. The last section concludes this paper by discussing the prospects and challenges of the framework.

While I will rely primarily on evidence from U.S. politics throughout the paper, it is written with application to segmented politics in general.

I. LIMITS OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMAGE OF SEGMENTED DOMESTIC POLITICS

Well then, what is the problem with the conventional image of domestic politics? To put it simply, the problem lies in the fact that scholars have been content to grasp segmentation in domestic politics unidimensionally.

It has been the widely accepted practice to discuss this issue in terms of ‘national-local’ or ‘center-periphery’ relations, using such terms as ‘national politics’ and ‘local politics.’ Since the meanings of these terms are usually taken for granted, studies that actually go to the effort of defining them are rare, if not non-existent. There seems to be, however, a serious flaw in such an understanding of domestic politics that has led to, and in time amplified, a conceptual confusion on this subject.

Take, for instance, the term ‘local politics.’ Its meaning may seem axiomatic at first sight, but the expression can in fact be, and has actually been, used in the following two senses: first, as ‘politics that develop within a given subnational (‘local’) territorial arena,’ and second, as ‘the political process regarding subnational (‘local’) government.’ Even though there is an empirical overlap between these two definitions, the two cannot be identical, for the political process not only of subnational government but also of national government takes place in a given regional arena (for example, think of elections that select representatives for the national legislature from ‘local’ districts).
The fact is that these two meanings belong to different dimensions. While the former deals with the spatial or territorial aspect of politics, the latter concerns the level of government. In other words, what the former meaning has to do with is the territorial unit of the political arena; the latter pertains to the government involved. This in itself should come as no surprise to students of U.S. politics, since ‘[i]t is well known that political authority in the United States has never been horizontally or vertically integrated.’ The trouble is that these two meanings, spatial and governmental, each belonging to a different dimension, have so far been unconsciously packed into each of the above two terms, ‘national’ and ‘local’ politics.

As a result of such confusion between the two dimensions, the actual usage of these two terms has taken the following two forms. In some cases, as one can easily imagine, these terms have been used with emphasis on one of the two dimensions. In other (and perhaps more) cases, however, the two meanings, and therefore dimensions, have been combined and narrowed into one, in each of the two terms. In this latter usage, the two expressions have respectively come to mean ‘politics that develop within a nationwide/subnational territorial arena that involves national/subnational government.’ What is striking (and also problematic) about this particular set of definitions is that it is not just unidimensional but dualistic in the sense that it virtually divides domestic politics into two distinct domains. The two spheres of politics, ‘national’ and ‘local,’ are here conceived as separate from each other.

The impact of such a combination of the two conceptual dimensions, and the resulting dualistic image of politics, on the trend of research in segmented politics cannot be overestimated. ‘National’ and ‘local’ politics have so far usually been studied separately, and this dominant research strategy obviously has in turn further fortified the dualistic political image. In the case of the U.S., the long-prevailing notion of dual federalism which assumes that federal and state government act in distinct constitutional spheres undoubtedly contributed to set the course of research in the same way. Different levels of politics that deal with governments of different levels that take place in different territorial units, even though developing inside the same national territory, seem to have been treated as if they have little to do with each other.

To be sure, not all research interprets domestic politics as completely dualistic. Here, I will review three approaches developed by political scientists who have dealt with the segmentation of domestic politics and
point out their strengths and weaknesses, in order to find out what must be done to tackle this issue in a better way.

The first approach, widely known as intergovernmental relations, or IGR, was introduced in the United States well over a half century ago to analyze the workings of its federal system. Those who developed this approach were particularly interested in, and quite successful at, breaking through the myth of ‘dual federalism’ by demonstrating the collaboration between federal, state, and local governments. In a seminal phrase, Morton Grodzins likened the structure of the American federal system characterized by interaction and cooperation between different levels of government to a marble cake, whereas a layer cake represents the system based on ‘dual federalism.’ IGR has eventually come to form a subdiscipline in political science.5

This approach, however, has certain limits when viewed from our present concerns. As its name shows, IGR puts its analytical emphasis on the dimension of government, and focuses especially on the activities of executive branches of national and subnational governments. As a result, the issues typically taken up in research are financial and/or jurisdictional, and most of the players considered to be relevant are political officeholders.6

The practitioners of IGR, in other words, have not only failed to take up the spatial dimension of politics, but also are so far largely uninterested in covering the non-public sector. It is, therefore, hardly qualified to be an ideal tool for the analysis of the interplay between different dimensions and levels of domestic politics at large. This is why Daniel Elazar, a long-time leader of the study of federalism in the United States, once lamented that ‘[the] definition of federalism commonly used by students of government today has diminished the original meaning of the term, to make it virtually synonymous with intergovernmental relations.’7

Peter Ordeshook recently made an attempt to overcome this problem in a study on the viability of the contemporary Russian federal system. In it, he points out that a model of the federal system that strictly separates different levels of government has the tendency to assume an ‘antagonistic’ relationship between national government and federal subjects. In its place, he proposes to bring in the notion of ‘blurring’ the distinctions between levels of government. In arguing that the ‘integration’ of the federal system is essential in stabilizing the politics of democratized Russia, he claims that this ‘blurring’ would play a key role in accelerating integration.8
The important contribution of Ordeshook's approach is that it seeks to utilize not only formal institutions and actors but also informal ones to achieve a more 'integrated' federation. Drawing from the cases of the U.S., Germany, and Canada, he emphasizes the role of political parties operating throughout the federation regardless of level of government. He shows that the activity of political parties, coupled with changes in electoral rules, such as holding elections for offices of different levels of government on the same day, helps blur the line between different levels of government. At the end of his study, he even makes some suggestions for changes in electoral rules that would in his view facilitate the emergence and operation of such 'national' political parties.

While dealing primarily with the case of Russia, Ordeshook's work is significant in bringing non-public sectors, in this case political parties, into the analysis of segmented politics. His framework, however, is still limited as a model for systematically analyzing the structure of domestic politics. This is because governmental and spatial dimensions are somehow mixed up into a single dimension, as shown in his key concept, 'integration.' What seems especially problematic in this regard is that his analysis, by concentrating on the 'blurring' of distinctions between different levels of government, effectively leaves out the spatial dimension, even though he does not do this intentionally.

Is there an approach that squarely meets this challenge of including the spatial dimension in analysis, then? Jim Bulpitt develops an approach to segmented politics or, 'the general relationship between national and local politics' in his book-length study on the politics of the United Kingdom. After reviewing and criticizing the existing analytical frameworks for the subject, including IGR, he presents what he calls 'territorial politics' as an alternative. This is defined as 'that arena of political activity concerned with the relations between the central political institutions in the capital city and those interests, communities, political organisations and governmental bodies outside the central institutional complex, but within the accepted boundaries of the state...' Bulpitt's reconfiguration of segmented politics is notable in two ways. First, as in the case of Ordeshook, it does not leave out the non-public sector altogether, even though it apparently gives more weight to governmental institutions. Second, as the name of his approach shows, Bulpitt is obviously well aware of the significance of the spatial, or 'territorial,' dimension of segmented politics.

Unfortunately, however, this 'territorial politics' approach cannot sufficiently serve our purpose of systematically analyzing segmented
domestic politics. This is because even though it refers to both territory (space) and government, they are bound together (central government with the capital city, local government(s) with the peripheral region(s)) and effectively form a core/periphery structure, making the approach essentially unidimensional, as was the case with Ordeshook’s work. The fact that Bulpitt makes the assessment of the state of territorial politics only by reference to ‘centralisation’ illustrates that this approach is basically a government-oriented one with only an occasional nod to the spatial dimension of politics.¹¹

In the end, it seems that we are left without an analytical framework that sorts out the two dimensions of domestic politics in a satisfactory way. One area of research on the United States in which this situation is particularly visible is that of historical studies of politics in individual states. While research interest in this field has steadily increased during the last few decades, scholars who have undertaken this kind of research seem to be at a loss when it comes to bringing politics regarding different levels of government to terms. Lacking a systematic perspective, many studies simply end up scrambling together two different levels of politics, one related to the federal government and another related to the state government, although there are several notable exceptions.¹²

Figure 1 presents the conventional image of segmented domestic politics. The base of each cone indicates the territorial (spatial) unit in which the political process takes place, and its apex represents the government that corresponds to the unit, making the interior of the cone the political process (‘political space’) related to the government that unfolds within the territorial unit. In this image, ‘national’ and ‘local’ politics belong to different spheres, only inadequately bridged by IGR, because of the conceptual mix-up between the two dimensions of politics, space and government. Other approaches, such as Ordeshook’s and Bulpitt’s, are still one-dimensional one way or the other, even though they do have the strength of taking up non-governmental actors. Is there a solution to this problem?

II. TWO DIMENSIONS, TWO AUTONOMIES: INTRODUCING INTERPOLITICAL RELATIONS

From the discussion above, it seems that there are two things that need to be done in order to overcome the limits of the conventional image of segmented politics. First, each of the two dimensions, those of space and
government, that have so far been mixed up in one way or the other, must be singled out as individual dimensions. Second, the research agenda on segmented politics ought to be stretched out so that not just governments but the entire political process, including non-governmental actors such as political parties, interest groups, and ordinary citizens, can be taken up. To accomplish these two tasks, I will develop an analytical framework based on these findings.

To begin with, I will bring in a set of multi-level politics for each of two dimensions, space and government, in order to distinguish between them. As to the spatial dimension, domestic politics can be classified according to the size of the territorial unit. Politics that involve the whole nation as a single unit would hereafter be called ‘nationwide’ politics, whereas politics that take place within a certain subnational regional unit would be called ‘regionwide’ politics. In regard to the governmental dimension, politics concerned with the national government would be called ‘national-level’ politics, making politics related to subnational government(s), ‘subnational-level’ politics.13

Consequently, the politics of a nation will be treated as a complex in which different levels of politics in two intersecting dimensions interact with each other. Since this framework deals with the relationships between different dimensions and levels of politics, I will call it and its subject, ‘interpolitical relations,’ or IPR.14 Figure 2 shows the two-
dimensional political image of IPR. In contrast with Figure 1 that shows the conventional, dualistic image of domestic politics, here we can see that different levels of political process are not just closely related but in fact overlap with each other in both of the two dimensions.

Different from the conventional image of domestic politics that tacitly presupposes the separation of the political process between different levels and dimensions, in IPR, it is nothing surprising that they are connected with and affect each other. As a result, a single political phenomenon will have different meanings in the two dimensions. In addition, it would often become difficult to fix the boundary between the different levels of political process in each political dimension. The amendment process of the U.S. Constitution that requires both proposal by Congress and ratification by the states is a good example. On the one hand, by requiring action of both federal and state governments, it connects state- and federal-level political processes in the governmental dimension. On the other hand, since the ratification (or its failure) in a state clearly has a nationwide effect, it cannot take place without more or less being affected from outside, which results in the interaction of nationwide and statewide political processes.
This kind of difficulty of differentiating between multiple levels of political process in two dimensions may lead one to conclude that IPR is an approach of little significance. As the above example shows, however, the connection between different levels of political process is in itself nothing unusual, and is not caused by the adoption of IPR. What really is problematic is the fact that the connection has been more or less unnoticed by those who study segmented politics, due to the predominance of the dualistic image of domestic politics. IPR, therefore has the prospect of not only discerning the degree of connection between different levels of political process but also of analyzing its character, since it grapples with the intricacy that is inherent, but hitherto largely ignored, in the nature of segmented domestic politics.

In order to achieve these goals, the following two questions must be answered so that IPR can be applied to the real world. First, what makes one set of interpolitical relations (of a country, at a certain point in time) different from another? In other words, how can interpolitical relations be measured? Second, after having established the form of measurement, we need to find out on which element of politics we should focus our attention to determine the state of interpolitical relations.

Conventionally, the measurement most commonly used in understanding the state of segmented politics has been the degree of ‘centralization’ or, the ‘strength’ of central government, which is the degree of concentration of political resources in terms of finance, jurisdiction, and authority in central government. This measurement, however, is unsuitable for analyzing interpolitical relations, as it is not only unidimensional but also concentrates its attention on government, leaving out the non-public sector.

In place of ‘centralization,’ I will bring in the degree of autonomy of a lower-level political process in relation to its higher-level counterpart in each political dimension as the measurement of interpolitical relations. This measurement pays attention to how much a subordinate-level political process in each dimension develops without being influenced or dominated by its higher-level counterpart. The reason autonomy is chosen instead of integration as the measurement is that we are here interested in how (much) the institutional segmentation within a national polity affects its political outcome, not, as in many studies that concentrate on public sectors, the level of penetration of the central state.

Note here that this degree of autonomy of a lower-level political process, especially in the governmental dimension, is different from the
relative ‘strength’ of a government. Even if its political resource is small, political process regarding a non-central government can still be strongly autonomous, at least in theory.\footnote{15}

If we draw two vertically intersecting axes, each corresponding to the degree of autonomy of a subordinate-level political process in a given dimension, we get a two-dimensional diagram. This can then be interpreted as a two-by-two matrix, each quadrant representing a certain type, or pattern, of interpolitical relations (see Fig. 3). This way, we now have four types of interpolitical relations, each corresponding to a cell of the matrix. From here, much of the discussion will be based on this typology.

In order to find out which cell of the matrix a set of interpolitical relations belongs to, we need to focus on those elements of politics that characterize interpolitical relations. While a countless number of candidates are available, since IPR covers the entire range of politics, I will concentrate here on two systems that play the critical role of organizing and maintaining modern constitutional democracy.

The first is the constitutional system organized around the national constitution that formally defines the institutional framework of the politics of a nation. We are interested here in how the political processes of
different governmental levels are formally connected (or, separated), rather than the division of authority between different levels of government, which is one of the main subjects for inquiry of IGR. Especially, the effect of any constitutional rule that requires a combination of the two levels of politics to generate a single outcome is worth a lot of our attention.

How the political process actually unfolds, however, depends largely on political actors. This is why we also need to take up the workings of party system. Among various political actors, such as interest groups and the governing elite, particular attention should be paid to political parties, since they play a constitutional, or constituent function in politics in most, if not all, modern democracies. To borrow the words of Theodore Lowi, the political party in a democracy ‘institutionalizes, channels, and socializes conflict over control of the regime’ [emphasis in the original].

Also, by paying attention to the role of political parties, we can shed light on the electoral and legislative process that has largely been overlooked under IGR, which is primarily interested in administrative process. What we need to find out here is how political parties bridge or divide different levels in the two political dimensions by looking into their organizational structures and activities. Other political actors will be taken up as they come politically in touch with political parties.

Once having grasped the essence of the research strategy of IPR, it might be natural to wonder how this approach is actually different from the conventional way of comprehending segmented domestic politics, and how constitutional and party systems form the basic structure of interpolitical relations. And to these questions we shall now turn in the next section.

III. THE IMAGINATION OF INTERPOLITICAL RELATIONS—THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY U.S. AS A TEST CASE

Among the strengths of the IPR, the most notable is its capacity to identify and analyze diverse structures of segmented domestic politics—in other words, interpolitical relations, including those hitherto ignored or unnoticed. In order to demonstrate this point, I will take up the half-century period in the nineteenth-century United States often called the ‘Partisan era,’ whose politics provides us with a case of type two interpolitical relations, and show how this approach can better get hold of the institutional features of the politics during the era.
But one caveat before we proceed: it is hard, if not impossible, to set a single, universal standard for measuring the degree of autonomy we are discussing here. The difference between the four cells mentioned above is therefore at best a relative one, which means that the same set of interpolitical relations may fit different parts of the matrix depending on the set of interpolitical relations it is being compared with. With this in mind, I will confine the comparison between different sets of interpolitical relations within U.S. political development. This treatment may not totally solve the problem, but overall stability of the nation’s constitutional and party systems should serve as basic conditions on which we can make a reasonable comparison of autonomy of lower-level political processes between different periods.

The reason I take up type two interpolitical relations is that of the four types, this particular pattern is the most distant from the traditional treatment(s) of segmented politics. Type two is diametrically opposite from type four, whose characteristics clearly fit into that of the dualistic political image, that of low autonomy of lower-level political process in the spatial dimension and high autonomy of lower-level political process in the governmental dimension. This particular type of interpolitical relations is also different from the other, more familiar, two types. Weak autonomy of lower-level political process in both dimensions of politics, the essence of type three, fits well with the traditional image of the politics of a nation with a ‘strong’ central state. Diagonally across the diagram we find type one with strong autonomy of lower-level political process in the two dimensions, whose institutional features correspond well with the political process usually associated with confederations.

Why, then, do we look into this particular era of U.S. political development? This is because when compared with other eras, the nineteenth-century period fits with the characteristics of type two, and this has something to do with the way the nation’s interpolitical relations were structured by the constitutional and party systems. On the one hand, the U.S. constitutional system was established and has functioned under federal principles that tend to autonomize the lower-level political process in two dimensions. On the other hand, the U.S. party system has been doing the exact opposite; since political parties have played a crucial part in politics, operating throughout the U.S. at every level of government, they have worked as the ‘solvent of federalism.’¹¹ U.S. interpolitical relations, therefore can be understood as the outcome of the constant rivalry between the constitutional and the party systems.
The American ‘Partisan era,’ during which it is thought that the nationwide two-party system fully developed for the first time and thrived the most, provides us with a case of tremendous interest in this regard, especially when compared with the eras that came before and after.

U.S. interpolitical relations of the half-century period immediately following the American Revolution, sometimes referred to as the ‘Pre-partisan era,’ is characterized by high autonomy of subordinate-level political process in both dimensions, due to the dispersive constitutional system and the absence of a fully developed party system. U.S. politics of this era lacked strong institutional links, formal or informal, between different levels in the two political dimensions. The result was a spatial segmentation along state borders and the separation of federal- and state-level political processes within statewide politics. This situation is well represented by the presence of a ‘dual party system’ in several states, that is, two distinct sets of political parties (factions) each organized to fight elections at different levels, federal and state.19

Although quasi parties were born inside the federal government around the turn of the century, the Federalist party had practically disintegrated by the 1810s, without being able to infiltrate into state-level politics. Battles between Republican factions would be the rule for the next couple of decades. There was little political uniformity among the states, and statewide politics were fought primarily over state-level issues. The strong autonomy of state-level political process during this period is aptly illustrated by the generally higher electoral turnouts for state-level elections than their federal-level counterparts, including Presidential elections.20 In the ‘Pre-partisan era,’ therefore, the condition of both constitutional and party systems pointed towards type one interpolitical relations.

In contrast, the low autonomy of subordinate-level political process in both dimensions seems to characterize the ‘Post-partisan’ era of the twentieth century. The most notable change that affected the condition of U.S. interpolitical relations during this period occurred in the constitutional system in the direction of strengthening the federal government. The role of the government rapidly increased in both domestic and foreign affairs, making the President the focal point of U.S. politics. The President was no longer the important but nonetheless chiefly symbolic figure of the ‘Congressional Government’ of the nineteenth century. He was now expected to demonstrate strong leadership as both chief executive officer and leader of a major party.21
Since the major parties were organized around federal-level issues and connected different levels of political process in two dimensions (as was also the case in the ‘Partisan era’), this development in the constitutional realm resulted in the weakening of autonomy of subordinate-level political processes in general. Thus, U.S. interpolitical relations shifted to the lower-left cell of the matrix, that of type three.

In the ‘Pre-partisan’ and ‘Post-partisan’ eras, the autonomy of the subordinate-level political process was either low or high in two dimensions. If these two were the only possible patterns of interpolitical relations, there may be not much need for two dimensions in the analysis of segmented politics. Being sandwiched chronologically between these two periods, however, the nineteenth-century period occupies a unique place in the nation’s history, in which the tension between the full-fledged nationwide party system and the federalist-oriented constitutional system created a ‘compromise’ between them. The result was a set of interpolitical relations with strong autonomy in statewide politics and weak autonomy in state-level political process, that of type two.

How were such interpolitical relations structured? The political parties of the nineteenth century that emerged through conflicts in federal-level political process linked the politics of different states of the Union and different governmental levels by extending their organizations throughout the nation and by fighting elections at all levels of government. As we have seen above, such characteristics would be held over into the twentieth century.

The nineteenth-century parties, however, were different from their twentieth-century counterparts in an important way. Even though the parties of this period contributed to making the state-level political process less autonomous, the autonomy of statewide politics was largely retained throughout this period, due to the high level of independence of party organizations in each state. The ‘national’ political parties of this era did not have central organizations, at least none strong enough to dominate the organization in each state. Also, the leadership of Presidents in this era was considerably weaker than that in the twentieth century. Party leaders in each state could act on their own behalf in both electoral and legislative processes, even in the field of federal-level politics, regardless of the behavior of their fellow partisans in other states. As a result, the same party could and often did take different, even opposite, stands on both federal- and state-level political issues in different states.22
At the same time, not only federal-level but also many state-level elections were often fought over federal-level issues. In this era, it was nothing unusual for a gubernatorial or state-legislative election campaign to be conducted with an emphasis on federal-level issues such as the tariff or the national banking system, even though the issues were hardly relevant to the constitutional capacity of the offices in question. Members of state legislatures were divided along party lines, which were based on federal-level conflicts, and more often than not they behaved as partisans, rather than forming groups based on preferences on state-level issues. The following case of a mid-nineteenth century state-level election depicts the nature of the interpolitical relations of this period particularly well.

It goes without saying that the Illinois state-legislative election of 1858 is one of the most notable state-level elections in American history. This is because of the public debates involving Abraham Lincoln, future President of the U.S., and Stephen A. Douglas, an incumbent U.S. Senator from Illinois, that took place during the campaign. During the course of seven debates that stretched across two months beginning in late August, the two argued fiercely against each other over the then burning issue of slavery, especially on the question of the institution's extension into the West. The event received nationwide attention and paved the way for Lincoln, who proved himself to be a more than worthy opponent for Douglas, the 'Little Giant' of the Democratic party, to be nominated as the Republican Presidential candidate in 1860.

People with any knowledge of American political history must be familiar with this episode, the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Not much attention has been paid, however, to the important and yet somewhat puzzling (that is, from the perspective of the early twenty-first century) fact that neither the two rival politicians nor the main subject of the debate seems to have had any direct connection with the election. After all, neither of the two politicians was a candidate for state legislator, and the state legislature itself had no constitutional capacity to interfere with the affairs in the U.S. territory. How, then, was the event related to the campaign, and what does it tell us about the interpolitical relations of the nineteenth-century U.S.?

The answer to this important question can be found by looking into the constitutional and party systems of the day that set the framework of interpolitical relations. The constitutional system tells us why the two politicians were campaigning. Until the late nineteenth century, U.S.
Senators were chosen not by direct elections but by state legislatures. And in this case, the Illinois state legislators who were about to be elected were due to select a new U.S. Senator. Douglas was the incumbent whose term was about to expire and who was fighting for reelection, while Lincoln was the contender, who had been nominated as a candidate by the recently held state Republican convention.25

The constitutional arrangement only, however, cannot cover the whole question. In order to show why the campaign was organized in such a manner, we must also turn to the party system, since the institutional features of the two major parties defined the style of the campaign. The state-level electoral campaign was dominated by the question of slavery in the territory, a federal-level issue, not just because it was a vital political issue, but also because the two major parties were organized according to preference on federal-level issues. At the same time, the absence of commanding national party organizations enabled the party leaders in each state, in this case, those of Illinois, to take any stand of their choice on political issues, even on those at the federal-level.

This example shows that, in this so-called ‘Partisan era’ of the United States, the political process of different levels in the governmental dimension was highly integrated with the predominance of the federal-level process over its state-level counterpart, while statewide politics stayed highly autonomous at both state and federal levels. Such a combination of parameters in two political dimensions obviously corresponds well with that of type two of interpolitical relations.

I have already pointed out the problems of the conventional, dualistic understanding of domestic politics. While the criticism holds true generally, it becomes particularly persuasive when it comes to this pattern of interpolitical relations. It seems that researches based on the dualistic image of domestic politics which have been unable to perceive this pattern of interpolitical relations have missed the critical structural features of nineteenth-century U.S. interpolitical relations.

Studies on ‘national politics,’ or, the nationwide federal-level political process, have most of the time overlooked the fact that statewide politics of this era had strong autonomy even in the federal-level political process. This is especially true for the studies that look into the relationship between political parties and their policy preferences. In many instances, researchers, especially political scientists studying past politics, tend to assume that one political party held a single view on a political issue throughout the nation, even though it did not, at least in most
cases. The national party platform, on which they usually rely, must be considered a compromise between fellow partisans from different states, at best.26

Unfortunately, works on ‘state politics’ do not fully cover the interpolitical relations of the Partisan era either, for they are usually conducted with interest in the statewide state-level political process. Although many of them take up the federal-level political process directly related to the state in question along their way, they tend to overlook the inherent tension between the two levels of political process in the governmental dimension. Also, the piling up of case studies of individual states does not in itself lead to the comprehension of how the autonomy of statewide politicssystemically affects the nationwide (and federal-level) electoral and policy outcomes. This can only be achieved with an approach that fully takes the spatial segmentation of a nation’s politics into account.

All of this goes to show that the interpolitical relations framework has not only the strength of untangling the threads of segmented politics by its two-dimensional approach, but that it has the promise of generating new models for empirical research that would further broaden our understanding of the subject.

**CONCLUSION**

In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the limits of unidimensional interpretation of segmented domestic politics, and have introduced a two-dimensional analytical framework, interpolitical relations, to replace it. In the process, I have emphasized the importance of including the non-public sector within the scope of research in order to study domestic politics at large.

While the notion of interpolitical relations should be applicable to any polity with more than one subnational territorial unit, the conceptual framework seems particularly promising for the analysis of U.S. politics, as was suggested in the preceding section. This is because the lower-level political process in both of the two dimensions has maintained a relatively high level of autonomy and also because the non-public sector has played a critical role throughout the nation’s history.27 It is not accidental that Stephen Skowronek argues in his monumental work on the development of modern state in the U.S. that the American state during the first century after the Revolution was characterized by the
‘courts and parties,’ the institutions that embody the two systems which form the structure of interpolitical relations.28

Analytical usefulness alone, however, does not assure the success of the approach. The framework still needs much more sophistication and improvement. For instance, standards for comparison between different sets of interpolitical relations, even between those of different nations, must be developed. Also, actors of the non-public sector other than political parties, such as interest groups, should be further incorporated into analysis. This would be crucial if we are to apply IPR to contemporary U.S., for it has been argued that the control by two major parties over U.S. politics has gradually declined through the last century, especially during its last four decades.29 It is a cost that naturally arises from analyzing segmented politics two-dimensionally, but the cost, I believe, is well worth paying.

NOTES

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1 Although there are usually more than two levels of government in a given nation, I will take up only the two ‘top’ levels of government in this paper, federal and state levels in the case of U.S., in order to prevent the discussion from becoming overly complicated. As a result, non-central government dealt with in this paper is actually what is often called meso government, even though it is referred to as ‘local’ government, following the conventional usage. On the notion of meso government, see L. J. Sharpe, The Rise of Meso Government in Europe (London: Sage Publications, 1993).


11 This is why his analysis has its own problem of being dualistic. Ibid., pp. 60–66.
13 Hereafter, ‘national,’ ‘regional,’ and ‘subnational’ may be replaced by the actual names of the level of government or the territorial unit in question, as in ‘federal-level’ or ‘state-level’ politics.
14 For the sake of clarity and convenience, I will hereafter use ‘IPR’ to refer to the approach and ‘interpolitical relations’ when referring to its subject.

David Herbert Donald, *Lincoln* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), pp. 205–211. It must be noted, however, that the nomination of a U.S. Senatorial candidate by a state party convention was an exceptional practice even in the historical period. In fact, according to Donald, Lincoln’s nomination was only the second of its kind in U.S. history.


In this paper, space did not permit me to explain the role played by the actors of non-public sectors other than political parties. As for the organizational structure and the style of activities of interest groups during the late Partisan era, see the following: Elisabeth S. Clemens, *The People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890–1925* (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1997); Theda Skocpol, “How Americans Became Civic,” in Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), 27–71.
