Race, Class, and Gender in America’s “War on Poverty”: The Case of Opal C. Jones in Los Angeles, 1964–1968

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I INTRODUCTION

The “War on Poverty” was officially launched in August 1964 with the signing of the Economic Opportunity Act and the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The “War on Poverty” created and administered many kinds of novel programs, but the Community Action Program (CAP), designed to “help urban and rural communities to coordinate and mobilize their resources to combat poverty,” was its most important and unique feature. CAP established more than one thousand Community Action Agencies and required the involvement not only of representatives of public and private agencies involved in anti-poverty programs, but also representatives of the “poor” themselves in policy planning and execution.¹ In many cities, Community Action Agencies became the main institutions to administer various kinds of “War on Poverty” programs.²

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which a local welfare activist forcefully challenged the official federal/local anti-poverty institutions and created oppositional discourses that could work against them. It investigates both the institutional discourses and their grassroots challenges. First, I argue that the Office of Economic Opportunity

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ignored racial/class differences among women involved in the anti-poverty programs, and enforced women’s subordination by locating women as supporters, not as main agents of the “War on Poverty.” Then, I focus on a particular welfare activist in Los Angeles, Opal C. Jones, and bring her voice forward as a representative voice of local welfare activists. I analyze how Jones was actively engaged in recasting the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” programs by both stressing the role racial inequality played in creating poverty and providing an incisive critique of assumed “professional” anti-poverty workers. In this way, I examine the ways in which race, class, and gender intersected in the career of Jones, one of a few African American female directors in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty.”

Interpretations of the “War on Poverty” programs initiated through CAP have varied from those that criticize CAP bitterly to those that appreciate its unique and innovative aspects. Daniel P. Moynihan argued that the participation of the “poor” through CAP was not intended by any drafter, sponsor, or enactor, and that CAP actually caused turmoil and further deterioration in urban ghettos. David J. Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson and James A. Morone supported CAP because the participation of the “poor” through CAP helped African Americans and other people of color participate in local politics and develop community organizations. Jill Quadagno agreed with Greenstone, Peterson, and Morone that CAP succeeded in bringing basic resources to “poor” communities and producing opportunities for blacks to enter politics, but she also considered the question of whether CAP also encouraged the concentration of the black poor in inner cities.

These studies examined the impact of CAP on “poor” communities by focusing on the roles of policy makers or African American male community leaders, and therefore have not paid enough attention to the roles of the women of color who worked in CAP, mostly African American women. Whereas Moynihan criticized CAP from the viewpoint of the policy makers, Greenstone and Peterson, as well as Morone, supported CAP by citing the increasing numbers of black mayors and community organizations in urban settings. They did not analyze how women in “target” areas were actively involved in planning, operating, and even trying to reform CAP and “War on Poverty” programs in general.

While these studies focused on the roles of policy makers and the African American and Latino male community organizers, some recent
studies have begun to explore the role of gender and women’s involvement during the operation of the poverty programs. Jill Quadagno published another study, co-authored with Catherine Fobes, about women who were served by Job Corps, another important program in the “War on Poverty,” which demonstrated how Job Corps centers reproduced a gender division of labor by providing to women training primarily focusing on low-paying service and domestic jobs.6 Nancy A. Naples, on the other hand, examined how women working in CAP developed their careers and fought inequality and discrimination. She also demonstrated how race, class, and gender were intertwined in CAP workers’ political biographies.7

Though the study of women’s participation in the anti-poverty programs is a relatively new topic in the historiography of the “War on Poverty,” there have been a significant number of studies exploring the issues of race and gender in U.S. welfare policies in general. One of the important topics among these studies was demystifying the notion of “welfare dependency.” These studies analyzed the gender and racial subtexts of the “dependency” discourse. According to Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “dependency” was used to refer to the condition of poor women with children who made a livelihood with neither a male breadwinner nor an adequate wage and who received economic support from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The expression “welfare dependency” evoked the image of “the welfare mother,” often figured as a young, unmarried woman of color. These studies of “welfare dependency” discourse illuminated how the images of women on welfare, especially those of poor women of color, have been seriously distorted in the discussions of U.S. welfare policies.8

Whereas these studies of the discourse of welfare dependency certainly revealed the racialized and gendered nature of U.S. welfare policy, nevertheless many of them remained focused on policy makers and policy making, and challenges to the dominant discourse were usually not examined in any detail. In this way, they cast welfare activists merely as passive victims rather than active agents. Deborah Gray White argued that even though there were negative images of “the welfare mother,” welfare rights activists “refused to internalize” these negative perceptions. Fraser and Gordon also pointed out that welfare rights activists changed the perception of welfare as “a matter of claiming rights rather than receiving charity.” Gordon, especially, emphasized the idea that welfare history should not only investigate the racial and gender relations
of power but also reveal the agency of welfare activists in the making of the programs. It is important to analyze how these welfare activists attempted to recast welfare programs and transform anti-poverty efforts into vehicles for social change.9

Following two pioneering works that considered gender in the “War on Poverty” and race/gender issues in welfare programs in general, this paper investigates two related issues. First, before discussing the case of Opal C. Jones, it briefly analyzes how the OEO, which was the main federal agency for the “War on Poverty” programs, represented women, who participated in the programs, in their documents. I argue that the OEO looked upon women as a coherent group disregarding racial/class differences. The OEO also assigned women the roles of volunteers and supporters. Then I focus on an African American woman, Opal C. Jones, who worked in a particular program called the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” in order to investigate the ways in which she struggled to recast the anti-poverty programs at the local level. When local welfare activists like Jones started engaging in the “War on Poverty,” they transformed the programs into something sharply different from the one OEO originally set up, into weapons in a battle over the right to determine the meaning of welfare. I contend that Jones’ efforts not as a volunteer but as one of a few female directors resulted in expanding the roles available to women in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” providing a significant critique of the local welfare system that ignored racial/class differences, and restoring to welfare activists the status of historical agents. The example of Opal C. Jones provides a window which can throw light upon the interaction of race, class, and gender relations in the “War on Poverty” programs.

Since the early 1950s, Opal C. Jones had been a social worker at the Avalon-Carver Community Center, established in 1940 to provide multi-service resources to low-income residents in south central L.A. Jones worked with distinguished social workers such as Mary Henry, who later established the nation’s first urban pediatric telemedicine center.10 Jones had been the executive director of the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP) since its inception in April, 1965. NAPP was one of the main programs administered by the main agency of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA). The primary purpose of NAPP was to provide training and employment opportunities for adults in ten “poverty” areas in Los Angeles county. As I will discuss later, Jones was
actively involved in bringing the “War on Poverty” to the grassroots level through the NAPP.

There are two reasons why I focus on Los Angeles. The first reason is the impact of the 1965 Watts Revolts on the “War on Poverty” programs. The Watts Revolts, one of the most significant urban uprisings in 20th-century America, shocked the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson and led to the organization of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” task force as well as an increase in federal anti-poverty funds coming into Los Angeles. Los Angeles was a city of special concern for the Johnson Administration. Therefore, Los Angeles provides the setting for an important case study to analyze how one African American woman in Los Angeles developed her career and confronted local welfare agencies after the Watts Revolts by using funds available from OEO. This leads to the second reason: Los Angeles was at the forefront of anti-poverty and racial liberation struggles, and a “local study” offers the benefit of observing how these programs operated at the grassroots level.11

This study draws mainly on the papers of the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project and Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, local newspapers, publications of the EYOA and the OEO, microfilms of *The White House Central Files*, and interviews with local activists.

II “WOMEN OF ALL AGES AND FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE Volunteered”: The OEO’s Representation of Women in the “War on Poverty”

OEO attempted to incorporate women (mainly white middle-class women) into the “War on Poverty” through various techniques. When feminist theorists like Quadagno and Fobes analyzed how the welfare state influenced gender relations, they explained that there were three ways of reproducing male dominance. Welfare policies could reinforce gender inequality by recreating market inequality through eligibility rules that closely connected benefits to wages. They might also reproduce inequality by providing greater rewards for benefits earned through paid work than for those granted on the basis of family membership. Finally, they could recreate the subordination of women by failing to intervene—by excluding women from welfare programs, because women were less competitive in the labor market if they could not find child care or take paid leave when they had children. Quadagno and Fobes emphasized that
the welfare state reinforced the gendered division of labor in the household as well as in the market through these mechanisms.12

OEO’s strategy for defining women’s roles in the “War on Poverty” was not based on the exclusion of women but rather on their mobilization. While their work provided useful insights, Quadagno and Fobes did not fully discuss the fact that techniques of “mobilization,” as well as those of “exclusion,” played an important role in recreating the subordination of women. OEO held two conferences in Washington D.C. in May 1967 and 1968 in order to clarify the roles of women in the anti-poverty programs. At the 1967 conference, Sargent Shriver, the director of OEO, emphasized how indispensable women were to that “war.” Shriver pointed out that fifty thousand women served on local community boards and advisory councils in the “War on Poverty” and that more than 10,000 women volunteers from all religious and racial groups had joined an organization called Women in Community Service. But he quickly added that despite this record of participation and involvement among women the OEO had only begun to “scratch the surface.” Put differently, with Head Start, OEO was reaching only 30 percent of the “poor” children who needed that program; with the Neighborhood Youth Corps and Job Corps combined, only 32% of the teenagers who needed job training were covered by the “War on Poverty.” Therefore, Shriver contended that women’s involvement in the anti-poverty programs was absolutely necessary. Shriver said, “these statistics show you how large the need actually is and from that you can easily see why we have called you to Washington.” Bill Crook, the director of the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), also emphasized the important roles of women in the “War on Poverty.” At the conference, Crook noted, “I believe that the feminine influence upon the national character of this country has been a dominant factor in the conception of the War on Poverty and it should be, I think, a driving force behind its application.” Both Shriver and Crook repeatedly referred to the importance of the roles of women in the “War on Poverty.”13

OEO aimed at mobilizing women into the anti-poverty efforts through these conferences because OEO needed strong support from women in order to pass the “War on Poverty” legislation. In a memo to President Johnson, Shriver clearly noted in 1967 that one of the purposes of this day-long conference was “mobilizing the various women’s organizations for legislative backing.” At the conference Theodore Berry, the director of Community Action Program, called women to “tell your con-
gressman back home that you are interested . . . and you support OEO.”¹⁴

These conferences were clearly designed by OEO to mobilize women for the anti-poverty programs.

In 1969, OEO published a report entitled “Women in the War on Poverty.” In this report too, OEO emphasized that American women had long been active in efforts to help the “poor,” as individuals and through various organizations. The report declared that many kinds of anti-poverty programs, such as CAP, Head Start, and the Job Corps, offered the chance for women to use “their ingenuity and creative talents, to rein- spire and reshape lives, and to participate in an urgent challenge to wipe out poverty.”¹⁵

There are two significant themes in this report. First, the report stressed that women of all ages and from all walks of life volunteered for the anti-poverty programs. It did not specify the differences among “women” in the anti-poverty efforts. At the conference too, OEO officials had emphasized that women of all kinds were vigorously involved in the “War on Poverty.” Yet some women who participated in the conference objected to this notion of women as a coherent group. For example, Frances Flores, a delegate from the League of Mexican-American Women, suggested that most of the women who were at the conference were members of established organizations dominated by white females. She pointed out that Mexican American women were not part of some of the established general groups and, consequently, they usually did not receive the opportunity to attend the conferences on the “War on Poverty.” Dorothy Height, a delegate from the National Council of Negro Women, also stressed the particular conditions for women of color, mostly African American women. She suggested that for the African American woman poverty was “a condition that has plagued her all her life.” Height added that although she spoke primarily of African American women, what she said had bearing for “all women of minority groups.” These women on the floor questioned whether all women were suffering poverty problems on the same level, and whether they were equally involved in anti-poverty programs.¹⁶

Second, although OEO endeavored to mobilize women into the “War on Poverty,” it tried to incorporate women into the anti-poverty efforts not as paid workers but as volunteers. Nancy A. Naples also suggested that OEO continued to define women’s roles in the “War on Poverty” in volunteer terms, stressing their important support roles, not their leadership roles. In the report, OEO emphasized that more than twenty million
women volunteers, either individually or as part of an organization, had participated in programs related to the “War on Poverty.” Of the more than 500,000 individuals who had volunteered for Head Start, for example, the majority had been women. Why did OEO stress the roles of women as volunteers? Naples pointed out that by constructing the pathway to prevention of poverty through expanding employment opportunities for poor men, women’s employment needs and their actual contributions needed to be ignored or marginalized. In other words, it was important for OEO to keep women as volunteers in order to secure the paid-jobs for poor men.

In order to reinforce the roles of women as volunteers, OEO also invented “a homemaker program” where women were trained in homemaking skills. The goal of this program was to train about 10,000 local women as “sub-professional homemaker aides.” These women would go to the homes of the “poorest of the poor” to instruct them in nutrition, sewing, home management, and the like. The creation of the “homemaker program” shows that OEO not only attempted to limit women’s roles to domestic matters but also tried to reformulate women’s subordination by assigning women the roles of aides.

OEO endeavored to mobilize women into the “War on Poverty,” emphasizing that women of all kinds were vigorously involved in the programs, but it located women as dependents, not as main agents of the programs. Before examining in detail the ways in which Jones would perform a role different from the one OEO expected women to play and pioneer new understandings of welfare, in the next section I briefly discuss how the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” came into existence.

III Los Angeles “War on Poverty”: The Establishment of EYOA and the Creation of NAPP

1. The Establishment of the EYOA

The Los Angeles “War on Poverty” formally started soon after the Watts Revolts in 1965. The central task force of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA), was established in September 1965. It was the successor to the Youth Opportunities Board of Greater Los Angeles, which had been set up to receive grants from President John F. Kennedy’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD). It took more than a year to establish the formal Community
Action Agency, EYOA, and this caused significant frustrations among the “poor” in Los Angeles. The Watts Revolts in August 1965, however, changed the situation greatly. The uprising continued for seven days, leaving thirty-four dead, over 1,032 injured, 3,592 arrested, and at a probable loss of $40 million in 1965 dollars. The Watts Revolts put “the stamp of urgency” on President Johnson’s desire to mount a concentrated attack on slum conditions.

On 18 August, President Johnson sent former Florida Governor Leroy Collins to solve the dispute over the Community Action Agency in Los Angeles, and then appointed a special task force to report on the causes of the revolts. One week later, based on the recommendation of the task force, the President authorized more than 45 employment, health, education, and housing programs for Los Angeles at a cost of $29 million. As a result, the OEO funds per “poor” family for the city of Los Angeles increased more than sixfold in the year following the Watts Revolts. The EYOA was established on 13 September 1965 under the coordination of Collins, and the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” finally began.

The EYOA was made up of three parts: a board of directors which decided EYOA policies, the director, and the employees who actually managed the programs. As a Community Action Agency, a component of the “War on Poverty” designed to promote the “maximum feasible participation” of the “poor” in the planning, policy-making, and operation of the anti-poverty program, EYOA required the participation of the “poor” on the board of directors. The board of directors originally consisted of three representatives from each of four public government bodies (the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and the Los Angeles County Schools); one representative from each of six local organizations (United Way, AFL-CIO, The Welfare Planning Council, The Los Angeles County Federation of Coordinating Council, The Chamber of Commerce, and The League of California Cities); and seven representatives elected by the residents of the “poor” areas. Joe Maldonado, a Mexican American with a background in social work, who had been the executive director of the Youth Opportunities Board, became the first executive director of EYOA. The number of employees was 245 on 31 October, 1966. EYOA continued to function as a comprehensive planning and coordinating body and retained certain administrative responsibilities for the programs.

Although EYOA required the participation of representatives of the “poor” in its decision making process, these representatives’ actual
power on the board of directors was limited. Dale Rogers Marshall participated on the board in 1968 and conducted interviews with the thirty-two board members. Marshall pointed out that while the participation of the “poor” had a significant influence on their careers, these representatives of the “poor” could not gain power over the decisions made by the board. In other words, whereas the increase in confidence, efficacy, participation, interest in community work, self-esteem, and leadership aspirations among the representatives of the “poor” certainly showed that they were activated by their experiences on the board, they were unable to match the public agencies’ predominant influence on the board. Thus the EYOA board was ultimately dominated by public officials. Opal C. Jones and other local leaders would criticize this point later.

There were three significant aspects concerning the funding of the EYOA. First, almost half of the funds went to educational programs, including Head Start, which was a child development program for preschool children in “poverty” areas. Second, the funding for job training and other employment programs was only 22% of the overall grant, and most of this money was aimed at youth, except in the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP). This was because the “War on Poverty” originally emphasized youth as its major focus in the attack on “poverty”: “to prevent entry into poverty.” Although EYOA created 48,797 temporary and permanent jobs for “poor” people and this provided the skills and experiences for “poor” adults, NAPP was the only program for adults who had already entered into “poverty.” Third, in addition to the educational and employment programs, Teen Post, which consisted of 150 recreational and cultural programs for teenagers in “poverty” areas, was one of the most popular programs in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty.” Overall, about 9% of funds were aimed at adults. While most of the anti-poverty funds were channeled into programs for teenagers, Opal Jones would provide significant critiques of the EYOA through the only program aimed at adults, the NAPP.

How did EYOA decide on the eligibility of persons for its programs? Based on the eligibility criteria issued by OEO in its CAP program guide, EYOA established their own standards for each program, but as for the definition of “poverty” in the election, the “poor” were defined as those with a family income of less than $4,000 regardless of the number of dependents. In 1960 whites comprised 73% of those below the poverty line in Los Angeles County. But a strikingly different picture emerges when the statistics are analyzed by racial/ethnic group. Only 17% of
“white families (excluding Spanish speakers)” were below the poverty line, while 34.7% of “non-white families” and 25.7% of “families with Spanish surnames” earned less than $4,000 annually.24

The main focus of the EYOA programs was not the white “poor,” who composed more than 70% of the “poor,” but African American and Latino “poor.”25 One of the major reasons why most of the anti-poverty funds flowed towards people of color was that it was the Watts Revolts that had led to the organization of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” task force as well as to the provisioning of federal funds. Mexican American leaders demanded equal opportunities for Mexican Americans, and as a result anti-poverty money went into Latino areas, too. The other reason was that EYOA didn’t administer anti-poverty programs directly to each “poor” family, but instead identified “major poverty areas.” And these “major poverty areas” were mostly places where African Americans and Latinos lived.26 The fact that the main focus of EYOA programs was on African American and Latino areas meant that the “War on Poverty” had to attack not only poverty problems in general, but also the relationship between racial inequality and poverty.27 Yet, EYOA did not make clear how poverty issues and racial issues were intertwined, but rather left local residents to tackle the racial issues by themselves. This would be another significant issue Opal C. Jones would critique later.

Next, I analyze the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP), the only program for adults, where Jones would play a significant role as a director.

2. Bringing the “War on Poverty” to the Grass-roots Level: The Neighborhood Adult Participation Project (NAPP)

The Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, funded by the OEO through the EYOA, was unique not only because it was one of a few programs operated by an African American woman, but also because it was targeted at adults rather than children or young people. The executive director, Opal C. Jones, clearly intended to bring the anti-poverty programs closer to the people and to mobilize “poor” adults in their neighborhoods. NAPP started its operation on 1 April, 1965, with ten neighborhood “outposts” located in Los Angeles County and 400 aides trained there. Soon the number of “outposts” had grown to 15: Avalon, Boyle Heights, Canoga Park, Compton-Willowbrook, El Monte, Exposition, Florence-Graham, Lincoln Heights, Long Beach, Los
Angeles Central, Pacoima, San Pedro, Venice-Mar Vista, Watts, and Wilmington-Harbor City. According to a NAPP pamphlet titled *This is the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Story in A Capsule*, NAPP had two purposes. First, it was established to bring anti-poverty programs closer to the people. Secondly, it would provide “pebble in the pond” change in the ways in which these agencies, services and programs are operated. In other words, its chief purpose was to link the anti-poverty programs with the people who were served by the programs, and to bring these anti-poverty programs to the grass-roots level, so that people in “poor” communities could have a louder voice in the operation of the “War on Poverty.”

The program of NAPP was threefold: Career Development, Neighborhood Development, and Information and Referral. Career Development was established for providing job opportunities for neighborhood adults in “poor” areas as aides at NAPP “outposts.” Through the Career Development program, these neighborhood adults were able to seek a new career and demonstrate their abilities as staff colleagues who could help improve the agencies’ services. Neighborhood Development was for organizing neighborhoods and their people to work on their own behalf “toward self-help, self-determination and total improvement.” Finally, Information and Referral was formed to link neighbors with the services for which they were entitled. The NAPP outposts helped neighborhood people find jobs and served as a liaison between the neighborhood adults and the anti-poverty agencies. NAPP also helped people improve their neighborhoods through various kinds of activities: offering residents English speaking classes, adult education classes, civil service instructions, and hot lunch for school children; helping neighborhood people install street/traffic lights and obtain crossing guards, boulevard stop signs, and pedestrian cross-walks; establishing a Saturday Clinic and expanding services in Public Health Centers. For adults in “poor” communities, NAPP acted as an important link to the EYOA in order to get these various services enacted. NAPP became one of the most popular programs for “poor” communities among the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” activities.
1. “It’s the Same Old Soup Warmed Over Unless We Become Agents of Change”: Opal C. Jones

Opal C. Jones started recasting anti-poverty programs through the NAPP. Jones wrote various kinds of pamphlets to explain the character of NAPP.30 This paper focuses on three sites in which Jones sought to address poverty: the connection between poverty and racial discrimination; the importance of the role of the people who were served by the programs; and the critique of professional anti-poverty workers. Jones did not explicitly discuss women’s rights or women’s roles in the anti-poverty programs. What Jones achieved as one of few female directors of color, however, resulted in the expanding of women’s roles in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” programs. By raising the three critical issues noted above, Jones forcefully challenged EYOA’s perceptions of what women should and should not do.

Jones paid particular attention to the connection between poverty and racial discrimination. She was invited to the hearing on the Examination of the War on Poverty held in Los Angeles in May 1967. In her statement, she criticized some people involved in the “War on Poverty” for ignoring the link existing between “poverty and discrimination,” and “housing [discrimination] and other forms of segregation.” In a pamphlet titled Strategy and Strategists, Jones wrote that anti-poverty workers had to tackle “all of the forces at work in the neighborhood,” including racism. Jones was fully aware that the EYOA and public officials involved in the “War on Poverty” failed to confront issues of racial discrimination seriously, especially those regarding residential segregation. Even though many anti-poverty programs targeted the districts inhabited by people of color, only poverty issues were discussed, and issues of race were usually left unexamined. Jones repeatedly emphasized, therefore, that the issue of racial discrimination could not be separated from the causes of poverty.31

Jones also vigorously encouraged the participation of the “poor” and believed their involvement and their perspectives were indispensable to the effective functioning of the program. In a report titled A New Look in Community Service, she pointed out that there were plenty of non-professional and neighborhood staff—“ready, anxious, willing and able to
work, to serve and become members” of the staffs of local social agencies, or to serve as neighborhood workers in the schools. Jones wrote, “I have discovered that for a long time they [neighborhood residents] have wanted to work with us—side by side in our social institutions.” Jones also conducted research on what neighborhood mothers wished their children’s teachers would do and introduced these mothers’ opinions into discussions of the “War on Poverty.” For example, one mother wanted her child’s teacher to educate him in “the role of the Negro in world history, especially the history of the United States.” Another mother hoped that teachers would become more involved in community activities. Jones regarded the people NAPP served not only as recipients of the anti-poverty programs but also as coworkers who would have innovative ideas and suggestions.32

Finally, Jones was critical of the “experts” involved in anti-poverty programs or the “professional” anti-poverty workers who lacked “sincerity,” as evidenced by her picture book titled Guess Who’s Coming to the Ghettos?. In the first segment, Jones provided a critique of the “experts” in “poverty problems,” who were mostly middle-class well-educated whites. Jones wrote:

They saw us as problems—as clients, as the poor . . .
They all became experts—with advice given free! . . .
They soon made studies; They researched us to death . . .
They kept up the old “maximum feasible line.” . . .
They sat back and waited for it all to take place . . .
With its new leadership, new voices, new plans, they cried—oh, the neighborhood is out of our hands! . . .
And so, they got busy and made new plans to determine the target—back in their hands [See Figure 1].33

Jones also critiqued the “professional” anti-poverty workers, who had seldom paid attention to the ghettos in the past but suddenly became “professional” workers in the “War on Poverty”:

Passed us each day with her head in the air. Lived near us and never seemed to care . . .
So, finally the war on poverty came here . . .
The neighbor became an expert in health and disease, the ghetto’s problems and the ghetto’s needs . . .
To be an authority in health, law, and crime, but tell us, dear lady, where have you been all this time?34
Jones was concerned about the absence of dedication on the part of anti-poverty workers. Jones was surely intent on critiquing “white middle-class experts” here, yet Jones also directed her critique at her own professional practices as well. Having worked as a professional settlement worker, Jones had always been interested in the relationship between the “experts” and people served by the programs. Jones emphasized that in order to ensure the participation of the “poor” in the anti-poverty programs, the “experts” or “professional” anti-poverty workers, including herself, had to change. She wrote in another pamphlet that “we must listen more and talk less, we must ask more and tell less, we must learn more and teach less, we must release control of some of the ideas that we have held as the “only way to fly.”’ Jones stressed that if NAPP workers were only content with the status-quo and would not be “agents of change” then all of the programs and every project would be “the same old soup warmed over.”
2. “How Much Do You Really Care?”: the Dismissal of Jones and the Reorganization of EYOA

Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty and the EYOA executive director Joe Maldonado saw Opal C. Jones and NAPP as a political threat. As early as the summer of 1965, Maldonado ordered Jones to stay away from the community and civil rights meeting, as Jones and other NAPP workers struggled to have a part in the formation of an Anti-Poverty group in Los Angeles.35

In February 1966, there was a rumor floating around that EYOA would fire Opal C. Jones. African American leaders in Los Angeles, such as Councilman Tom Bradley and Congressman Augustus Hawkins, had already complained that Yorty was trying to take over NAPP and EYOA by placing obstacles to prevent NAPP from mobilizing the “poor.” One of the core newspapers for African American residents in Los Angeles, The Los Angeles Sentinel, reported that Maldonado had allegedly said at the meeting that someone was causing confusion in the city’s poverty program and Robert Goe, Mayor Yorty’s representative on the EYOA board, had advised Maldonado to fire Jones. The Sentinel stated that this was because Jones and the successful operation of NAPP had become a “threat to the power structure of EYOA.”36

The conflict reached its climax in April 1966. Jones expressed her opinion that NAPP should be separated from the EYOA, and be operated for the benefit of the community. Maldonado contended that NAPP should work through the EYOA to help produce jobs. When Jones proceeded with a public meeting in March intended to clarify the role of NAPP in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” and improve the relationship between Mexican workers and African American workers, EYOA ordered Jones to cancel it. The 400 NAPP workers staged a protest march to the EYOA headquarters in support of Jones’ leadership on the 28th of March. Jones refused to cancel the meeting. Subsequently, on the 4th of April, Maldonado fired Jones.37

There were two grounds for the dismissal of Jones, according to EYOA. First, Jones was fired for “insubordination” after she refused to cancel the meeting. Maldonado explained that the decision to fire Jones was the result of the “unanimous agreement of the EYOA board members in attendance.” However, The Sentinel reported that this was not quite true. Rather, the seven representatives of the “poor” expressed as much surprise and shock at the dismissal of Jones as the rest of the community. Samuel Anderson, one representative of the “poor,” said that all
of the representatives were “disturbed and concerned about the dismissal of Opal C. Jones.” Secondly, Maldonado also accused Jones of having solicited funds from her aides for an unauthorized trip to Washington, D.C in September, 1965. Yet, Ursula Gutierrez, another poverty representative, explained that the EYOA board had no evidence of any wrongdoing by Jones. Gutierrez questioned Maldonado’s claim that he did not learn about the trip until February and had not brought the matter to the attention of the board “because of vacations and the time required to gather evidence.” Jones told The Sentinel that she had gone to Washington D.C. during her own vacation time in October and at her own expense to plead with the OEO to make NAPP a separate agency from EYOA. The Sentinel concluded that the real and recurring issue between Jones and the EYOA was the “philosophy behind the operation of her NAPP program.” The Sentinel suggested that the EYOA dismissed Jones because she tried to recast the anti-poverty programs to incorporate the voices of the “poor.”

Jones did not hold her tongue. Jones was fully aware that she was easily dismissed because she was one of the very few female directors. She said in The Sentinel, “I will fight for my own right and reputation as a social worker and for NAPP to become an independent, vital, community action program.” Then she continued by saying that Maldonado should treat her “not only as a woman, but as a staff member.” Jones thus demanded that Maldonado and EYOA change their perceptions of “appropriate women’s roles.”

Jones then wrote a pamphlet titled I Wonder Why Some People Don’t Like Me?, and sent it to Maldonado on the day she was fired. She wrote:

You will remember that our neighbors began to read the Community Action Guidelines and they discovered all about that “feasible participation.” But, although you always talked about your belief in the idea, I never really felt or thought you really meant it. Why? Because from time to time you expressed your lack of high expectation of neighborhood people; you expressed your doubts and you always seemed to shy away from conflict, criticism and “unsanded down” or real opinions.

You always seemed to be on the side of the powerful, and you always seemed to protect the “powerful” more than you seemed to “look out” for the “powerless.”

Jones asked Maldonado, who was once a social worker like Jones, a very fundamental question: “how much do you really care?” Jones knew that she was dismissed because she challenged the “powerful” and had
done her best to bring the anti-poverty programs closer to the “poor” people.41

The story did not end there. Jones actually succeeded in recovering her position as the director of NAPP. She even achieved her goal of wresting control of NAPP from EYOA. As more and more of the media in Los Angeles covered the controversy over the Jones dismissals, OEO, afraid of the negative impact on the “War on Poverty” programs, took action in order to settle the dispute. Sargent Shriver, the director of OEO, got Mayor Yorty and Maldonado to agree to rehire Jones as long as NAPP was divested from EYOA. On the 7th of April, Daniel Luevano, regional director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, issued a directive divesting EYOA from direct control over NAPP. On the 25th of April, Jones was rehired as interim director of NAPP in a temporary truce until EYOA could turn over control of NAPP to the Los Angeles Federation of Settlement and Neighborhood Centers Inc. in July 1966.42

The controversy over the dismissal of Jones had a strong impact on the organization of EYOA itself as well as its control over NAPP. Luevano also issued a directive stripping EYOA of its sole control over Community Action Program, although he declined to link his directive to the uproar over the battle for control of NAPP. EYOA was directed to reorganize and decentralize its operation. Four new agencies were created in late 1966 and early 1967 in Los Angeles County.43 Jones’ critique of EYOA led to the reorganization of EYOA in the end.

Furthermore, in spite of all these difficulties, Jones succeeded in keeping NAPP moving forward. In 1971, Jones received recognition for her achievements in NAPP, and was elected President of the Los Angeles Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers. The Los Angeles Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers was one of the most important delegate agencies in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty,” which operating Teen Post, Head Start, and NAPP as noted. Jones regarded this promotion as “an honor and a privilege” and made efforts to make the organization a vital instrument for attacking poverty. By 1976, NAPP had become the largest and oldest poverty program in L.A.44

V Conclusion

In this article, I have discussed how Opal C. Jones, a female welfare activist of color in Los Angeles, carried on the struggle against the official anti-poverty agency, the EYOA. Jones hoped that NAPP workers
would be the active agents of change. Like the female CAP workers in Philadelphia and New York depicted by Nancy A. Naples, Jones did not passively accept the subordinate role in the anti-poverty programs which OEO originally expected women to play. Jones was neither the tool of the OEO nor the EYOA. Rather, Jones vigorously encouraged the participation of the “poor,” and succeeded in bringing the anti-poverty programs closer to the residents in the neighborhoods. In so doing, Jones constituted a challenge to the OEO’s official representation of women. Moreover, she also challenged the EYOA’s vision of the programs as being dominated by the local anti-poverty agency rather than local people.

Whereas OEO did not specify racial/class differences among “women” in the “War on Poverty,” Jones saw the workers who participated in the “War on Poverty” as a diverse group comprised of people of varied social/economic status and race. Jones repeatedly referred to the relationship between racial discrimination, especially residential segregation, and poverty. She also paid close attention to the class differences between people who were served by the programs and the “experts” involved in poverty programs. By criticizing “professional” anti-poverty workers whom she believed lacked dedication, Jones provided a significant critique of the local welfare system that prevented the people served by the programs from playing an active role. Attacking racial discrimination, critiquing middle-class “experts” for ignoring the voices of the “poor,” and contesting EYOA’s notions of “appropriate women’s roles” were inseparable commitments in Jones’ political career.

Finally, Jones was not passive in her response to the dominant discourse constructed by the local anti-poverty agency, EYOA. As the historian Deborah G. White argued, local welfare activists involved in the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” like Opal C. Jones certainly refused to “internalize” the official discourse. What was equally significant was that Jones vigorously challenged and recast the official discourse by writing various kinds of pamphlets and documents herself. The historiography of the “War on Poverty” should shed light not only on the efforts of policy makers and male community organizers of color, but also on those of female welfare activists like Jones. In addition, studies of “welfare dependency” discourse need to pay closer attention to these local welfare activists so that they will be able to discuss how these activists waged (and continue to wage) struggles against the racialized and gendered nature of U.S. welfare policies. Opal C. Jones was not a powerless victim
but a historical actor who provided an alternative way of understanding
the meaning of welfare through the eyes of the people who were served
by the programs.

NOTES

1 I am using quotation marks (the “poor”) here to indicate the OEO and the Community
Action Agency in Los Angeles (the EYOA) determined the eligibility of persons to be served by the CAP using special ways and that their eligibility criteria were
not always clear. The OEO considered the following factors in determining which families and individuals were to be assisted: the number and proportion of low-income families, particularly those with children; the extent of persistent unemployment and underemployment; the number and proportion of persons receiving cash or other assistance on a needs basis from public agencies or private organizations; the number of migrant or transient low-income families; school dropout rates; military service rejection rates; other evidence of low educational attainment; the incidence of disease, disability, and infant mortality; housing conditions; adequacy of community facilities and services; the incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency. For certain programs such as Head Start, OEO used an income table as an indicator. For example, in 1968, “poverty” income for nonfarm households was defined as $1,600 for one person, and $2,000 for two, with increments averaging about $500 for each additional family member. While the EYOA generally followed OEO’s eligibility criteria, EYOA occasionally established its own standards. For example, as I discuss later, with regard to the definition of “poverty” in the election, the EYOA created its own original criteria and regarded the “poor” as those with a family income of less than $4,000 regardless of the number of dependents. U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, Community Action Program, Community Action Program Guide: Instructions for Developing, Conducting, and Administering a Community Action Program (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965), 21; U.S. General Accounting Office, Review of the Community Action Program in the Los Angeles Area under the Economic Opportunity Act: Report to the Congress on the Office of Economic Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 24–25.


11 Studies of the Los Angeles “War on Poverty” through CAP have produced two interpretations. First, Dale Rogers Marshall participated in the board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (EYOA) in 1968, and conducted interviews with the thirty-two board members. Marshall’s work is valuable since there are not many sources available today that focus on the EYOA board members. But her work concentrated on the impact of the participation of the “poor” on the EYOA board. Therefore, she did not examine how activists outside EYOA challenged the local and federal welfare agencies. Second, Robert Alan Bauman examined the history of the implementation of the “War on Poverty” in Los Angeles. He focused not only on the EYOA but also on the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, which was founded by labor unionists in the Watts area. He mentioned the activities of Opal C. Jones only briefly, and concluded that the “War on Poverty” in Los Angeles failed in many ways. Dale Rogers Marshall, “The Politics of Participation in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1969); Marshall, The Politics of Participation in Poverty: A Case Study of the Board of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971);

12 Quadagno and Fobes, 172.


16 OEO, Conference Proceedings, 1–2, 20–21, 40–41.

17 OEO, Women in the War on Poverty, 3; Naples, 5–6.

18 Memo to President Johnson, 23 August, 1968, Subject File, Box 32 (Reel 6) in The Presidential Documents Series, The War on Poverty.

19 The delay was caused by a political war between the Los Angeles city mayor, Samuel W. Yorty, who tried to make YOB the Community Action Agency in Los Angeles, and those who believed that YOB was controlled by Mayor Yorty and formed another alternative organization, called the Economic Opportunity Federation. For the establishing of the EYOA, see Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, Examination of the War on Poverty, 90th Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1967, 3846; Marshall, The Politics of Participation in Poverty; Publication, OEO, 25 November 1964, Subject File, FG11-15, Box 124 in The Presidential Documents Series, The War on Poverty.


21 At first, the EYOA was the only Community Action Agency in Los Angeles County. Four new agencies were created in late 1966 and early 1967 in Los Angeles County. U.S. General Accounting Office, Review of the Community Action Program in the Los Angeles Area under the Economic Opportunity Act, 5–6; Mary Kaye, Distribution of Poor Youths in Los Angeles County (Los Angeles: EYOA, 1967); v; Senate, Examination of the War on Poverty, 1964–1968.


24 U.S. General Accounting Office, 8–10; Memo, Robert L. Goe to Irvin Walder, 10 January 1966, Folder 126307, Box A-1938, Records Management Division, Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles, California; Senate, Examination of the War on Poverty, 3845.

25 Some people questioned this point during the hearing on Examination of the War on Poverty in Los Angeles in May 1967. For example, George Knox Roth, a research director at the General Research Consultants in Pasadena, stated that “the Negro and Mexican-American poor have been favored both with jobs and assistance with an almost
total disregard for the other segments of the poor equally in need of assistance.” Senate, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3986.

26 Ibid., 3895–98.

27 Senate, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, 3979–80, 3986.

28 Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, *This is N.A.P.P.: A Little Reader about the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project*, in Box 1, Neighborhood Adult Participation Project, Inc., California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles, California; N.A.P.P., *NAPP Now: An Explanation of the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Incorporated*, in Box 1, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; N.A.P.P., *This is the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Story in A Capsule*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.

29 N.A.P.P., *This is the Neighborhood Adult Participation Project Story in A Capsule*.

30 Although the pamphlets written by Jones were valuable sources, readers should note that there is a methodological problem concerning the use of her pamphlets. These pamphlets are important since they would help readers understand the character of the NAPP and Jones’ viewpoints toward the anti-poverty programs. Also, these pamphlets are significant because there are not many resources available today about a specific program funded by OEO through EYOA. Many of the pamphlets, however, do not have specific dates, so it is difficult to put them in chronological order and examine how her views changed after 1965.


34 Ibid., 14–21.

35 Opal C. Jones, *I Wonder Why Some People Don’t Like Me?*, 1 April, 1966, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC; Bauman, 195. Jones reacted to Maldonado’s orders by writing a picture book titled *New Committee in the Zoo*. Jones compared the power politics in Los Angeles “War on Poverty” to a zoo containing big mean animals (the “powerful” who tried to dominate anti-poverty programs for themselves), big kind animals (the “powerful” who tried to bring the programs closer to the people), small mean animals (the “powerless” who collaborated with big mean animals), and small kind animals (the “powerless” who tried to recast the anti-poverty programs based on the experiences of the poor people). Opal C. Jones, *The New Committee in the Zoo*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.


38 “Hearing on Dismissal Set Wednesday,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, 7 April, 1966, front page and D2.
39 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  

Sources: Opal C. Jones, *Guess Who’s Coming to the Ghettos?*, in Box 2, N.A.P.P., Inc, California Social Welfare Archives, Special Collections, USC.