American Missionaries in Korea
and U.S.-Japan Relations 1910–1920

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INTRODUCTION

Korea became the pivotal point of the East Asian regional area in the late nineteenth century when pressure from Japan, Europe, and the United States in the 1870s and 80s finally forced the nation’s closed doors open. Compelled by Japan to enter into diplomatic relations in the modern sense in 1876, Korea next entered into diplomatic relations with the United States in 1882. With rivalry over Korea sharpening in the 1880s and 90s between Japan and China on the one hand, and Japan and Russia on the other, Korea’s reliance on the United States increased, appeals for help being made repeatedly as Korea struggled to maintain her independence. These appeals were based on the 1882 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and Corea [sic], one article of which stated that “[i]f other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, thus showing their friendly feel- ings.” Nonetheless, the United States government continued to reject the Korean appeals.

In 1904–5, at the end of the Russo-Japanese war, Theodore Roosevelt’s administration strongly supported Japanese suzerainty over Korea by

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recognizing the so-called “Taft-Katsura Agreement” which related to American rule over the Philippines, Anglo-American-Japanese triangular cooperation for peace in the Far East, and Japanese suzerainty over Korea and the withdrawal of the American Legation in Seoul before that of the European nations in November 1905. Under these circumstances, society and culture in Korea received a strong impact from American Christianity. Originally, the Korean Dynasty, with its state religion of Confucianism, had outlawed Christianity. But King (later Emperor) Kojong abandoned this traditional policy and in fact made it possible for American missionaries to preach in Korea, in order to modernize Korea and to secure American assistance in case of any emergency threatening Korean independence. For this reason, the number of American missionaries, especially Presbyterians, not only increased in Korea but they also came to enjoy the fullest confidence of the Korean Dynasty and also the people because of their contributions to the modernization of Korea (for example, their building of missionary schools and hospitals).

In this period, the number of Korean Christians increased as the political situation in Korea was becoming increasingly strained and people turned to Christianity in their search for salvation and refuge. In August 1910, Japan annexed Korea with the conclusion of the Treaty of Annexation between the two nations, unopposed by the United States. But U.S.-Japan relations were growing strained after the Russo-Japanese War, because of the Manchurian problem, the problem of Japanese immigration to the U.S. West Coast, and the problem of a build-up of naval power on both sides. So Japan began to take a cautious attitude toward the United States in regards to the Korean problem after the annexation of Korea. Under these circumstances, American missionaries living and preaching in Korea became unwillingly involved in the tensions of the political situation brought about by the Korean Independence Movement. The reactions of the Japanese authorities and the conditions under which American missionaries lived in Korea had a considerable impact on U.S.-Japan relations. I would like to make clear the issues the American missionaries in Korea had to face.

THE JAPANESE ANNEXATION OF KOREA, THE KOREAN CONSPIRACY CASE, AND THE AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA

After the Japanese annexed Korea in August 1910, Huntington Wilson, the acting Secretary of State, instructed Thomas J. O’Brien, the
American Ambassador in Japan, to ask the Japanese Government about its policy toward missionary schools in Korea.3 Jutaro Komura, the Japanese Foreign Minister, replied that there would be no change regarding their protection and promotion by the Japanese authorities, a stance which Komura said reflected established policy toward missionary education in Korea.4 But in spite of this initial posture, a serious incident involving American missionaries in Korea soon took place. In 1911, apparently as a result of several Korean attempts in 1910 to assassinate Masatake Terauchi, the Governor-General of Korea (Chōsen Sôtoku), the Government-General of Korea (Chōsen Sōtokufu) arrested over 700 Koreans, many of whom were Christians. In 1912, the Governor-General sent 122 of those arrested to the Court of Justice, and 105 of them were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor. In the end, only six Koreans had their sentences imposed, but even they were released in 1915 after being granted amnesty.

This incident was said at the time to have been fabricated by the Japanese authorities because they wanted to suppress anti-Japanese Korean nationalism. In the course of the incident, however, Japanese authorities developed doubts about the relations between the arrested Koreans and American missionaries in Korea, especially Presbyterian missionaries, the biggest group in Korea at the time. In response, American Presbyterian missionaries in Korea and in the United States as well as the United States government and Congress, all denied any such relations and raised the question of whether the Japanese authorities had tortured the arrested Koreans in order to secure confessions.5

Presbyterian missionaries in Korea and the United States reacted to the so-called “Korean Conspiracy Case” in a variety of ways. In Korea, O.R. Avison, the director of the Presbyterian Severance Hospital in Seoul, Samuel A. Moffett, a Presbyterian missionary in Pyongyang, and Norman C. Whittemore, a Presbyterian missionary in Seoncheon, North Pyong-an Province, met with Terauchi on 23 January 1912. They told him that it was inconceivable that the arrested Koreans, who were among the most respected people in Korean society, should have legitimately fallen under suspicion. But Terauchi refuted their position and told them that the fact that so many Korean Christians had been involved in the plot had surprised him.6 Meanwhile, the key person among the Presbyterian missionaries, Arthur J. Brown, took a different line. Brown was at the time secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, located in New York City. At
first, Brown showed some sympathy toward the Japanese protectorate and the Japanese annexation of Korea, because he thought that Japanese intervention into the Korean situation had been necessary. So he was in a dilemma, divided between his pro-Japanese stand and the U.S.-Japanese frictions generated by the Korean Conspiracy Case. In February 1912, Brown met with Masanao Hanihara, the Japanese chargé d’affaires in Washington, D.C., and asked him to take proper measures against the arrested Koreans. After that, he made a trip to Washington, D.C., on 28 July 1912, with several other Presbyterian missionaries, in order to request involved officials to strive for a breakthrough in the difficult situation. They met with Sutemi Chinda, the Japanese Ambassador, with President William H. Taft, and also with Secretary of State Philander C. Knox and with William Sulzer, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At first, Sulzer showed considerable sympathy toward the arrested Koreans but his pro-Korean attitude changed after he met with Chinda. Brown also wrote a 27-page booklet outlining the details of the Case in 1912.

Brown felt some relief when most of the arrested Koreans were released by the Japanese authorities as a result of their assessment of the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Only six key members of the group were not released. But he continued to work toward a breakthrough in the difficult situation in Korea and as a result the Japanese authorities felt some dissatisfaction with the fact that his reactions to the Case were not in line with his previous pro-Japanese stance. This dissatisfaction became clear to him when he was forced to explain to the Japanese authorities in 1912 that neither he himself nor the Presbyterian Church had any connection to the reports about the Case that had appeared in many American newspapers and magazines. In this sense, it cannot be said that his anticipated goal was achieved.

Other missionaries besides Brown also became involved in the fall-out from the Case. Alfred M. Sharrocks in Seoncheon reacted to the first reports by asking for confirmation of the details from the Japanese authorities. Robert E. Speer received a report from Seoul that the “confessions” made by the arrested Koreans about the Case had been extracted from them by force, and in turn reported this to the Presbyterian Church in New York. Having it reported to him that Lieutenant General Motojirō Akashi had ordered the torture in order to extract “confessions,” J.G. Dunlop passed on this report to the Presbyterian Church in New York. It was General Akashi, the commander of the Military Police...
Corps, who built the system of military police in Korea which supported the so-called "Rule by Bayonet [Budan Tōchi]". It was generally reported that many of the arrested Koreans were asserting their innocence. It was also reported that the tortured Koreans prisoners had been taken to Severance Hospital in an extremely bad condition. Judging from these missionary reactions, it seems evident that many of them thought negatively of the measures taken by the Japanese authorities even while they were searching for the truth about the Case with as much objectivity as they could.

On the other hand, there were also pro-Japanese missionaries in Korea. The Rev. James G. Gale for example, a Canadian Presbyterian missionary in Seoul, demonstrated his sympathy for Terauchi with the statement that he had "succeeded to the difficult task of governing an alien people of Korea after the Japanese annexation of Korea." He further wrote that Korea had prospered or been improved by the Japanese intervention, and would continue to do so under the rule of Terauchi, a "Governor of good-manner and so kindly disposed to every one." He argued that Korea was under military rule at the time when the Case occurred, and that it had happened during "the period of change," thereby implying the necessity of overlooking faults in Japan’s governing of Korea. Bishop Merriman C. Harris, an American Presbyterian missionary in Seoul, met with Chinda twice in Washington, D.C., the two clearly sharing the same opinion of the Case and also of Yun Chiho, one of the leaders of the arrested Koreans, who had studied in the United States in his youth and had a large circle of American acquaintances.

In line with this view of the Case, the journalist George Kennan published an article in The Outlook of December 1912 in which he asserted that there was little concrete evidence of torture, that the issue of torture was essentially a Korean fabrication, that the accused Koreans were given the same kind of treatment as accused Japanese in Japan, that the Japanese authorities had no hostile feelings towards Christianity in Korea because they thought of it as contributing to the modernization of Korea, and that while American missionaries in Korea had sometimes been involved in politics before the Japanese annexation of Korea, involvement could not be tolerated under the present conditions. Yasutarō Numano, the acting Consul General in New York, responded to the article with an expression of Japanese gratitude, but in a letter to Kennan Moffett asserted that he was simply supporting Japan and that he had had better collect more information about the situation in Korea.
before making those kinds of statements. In fact, Kennan’s article had very little impact on most American missionaries because while they had considerable evidence of torture, Kennan was not writing from any firsthand observation or knowledge of the situation in Korea. Many American missionaries in Korea actively publicized the true facts of the Case both within Korea and beyond, and even approached the Japanese authorities directly as mentioned above, because they thought that they could not rely on George H. Scidmore, the American Consul General in Seoul, who simply said there was nothing he could do about the Case.

In response to these various American reactions to the Case, Kentarô Kaneko, a Privy Council advisor, argued that Terauchi had to prevent the influence of the resolution of the American National Mission Association on the trial of the arrested Koreans. But he also received another recommendation from Shinpei Gotô, then the Minister of Posts and the former civil administrator of Taiwan, that he had better adopt Inazô Nitobe, who had a large circle of American acquaintances, as a special envoy to the United States in order to neutralize the accusations made by American missionaries in Korea in the period 1912–13. The Government-General of Korea declared the six key arrested Koreans guilty in 1913, but then had their sentences reduced in 1914. Terauchi gave them amnesty in February 1915, after receiving permission from the Prime Minister, Shigenobu Ôkuma. On receiving news of these developments, Chinda informed the representatives of the main Christian bodies in the U.S., including Brown, and they responded to Chinda’s communication positively. The Japanese authorities resolved the Case in this manner because they felt that they had already successfully demonstrated their power over Koreans and because they felt that for the sake of stabilizing the Japanese rule of Korea it was important to avoid creating American missionary hostility towards Japan whether inside Korea or elsewhere. So the Case was settled in a way that was sensitive to the opinions of the American missionaries. But as it turned out, the Korean Conspiracy Case was only the prelude to a much larger incident, the March First Independence Movement of 1919.

**THE MARCH FIRST INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT OF 1919 AND AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA**

After the Japanese annexation of Korea, the Governors-General of Korea apparently developed the “Rule by Bayonet” with few problems.
Yoshimichi Hasegawa, who succeeded Terauchi as Governor-General when Terauchi became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1916, simply extended Terauchi’s policy. But all the time the dissatisfaction of many Koreans toward the Japanese rule of Korea was steadily increasing. This dissatisfaction was fed by a wide range of world events. In 1917, for example, the socialistic regime in Russia came into being as a result of the Russian Revolution. Other events included the end of the first World War and the resulting independence of subjugated nations in Europe in 1918, and the assertion of “a fair solution of the colonial problem” in “the Fourteen Points Address” by President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918. Shortly after the development of the Korean Independence Movement outside Korea in 1918, events inside Korea started to take a decisive turn. The sudden death of the former Korean Emperor Kojong in January 1919 provoked widespread doubts about the cause of his death, and with the gathering of many Koreans in Seoul to attend his funeral, the March First Movement started there in 1919. The Movement then spread throughout Korea, taking especially strong root in the north Korean areas where Christianity was more strongly promoted than in the south Korean area.30

The March First Movement was a fundamental expression of the dissatisfaction many Koreans felt toward the “Rule by Bayonet” and was in fact a protest against it. But the Japanese Government, the Government-General of Korea, the Japanese public, and many Japanese newspapers did not see it in that light but instead looked for other factors as the ‘real’ causes. They identified two “American Factors”: Korean misunderstanding of the so-called statement about “Self-Determination” made by President Wilson, and the influence on Koreans by Korea-based American missionaries.31 For this reason, American Presbyterian missionaries in Korea, Japan, and China and the Presbyterian Church in the United States had no choice but to become involved in the development of the March First Movement. How did the Japanese side behave toward them and how did they react to the situation?

Becoming aware of the fact that some Koreans outside Korea were starting to work toward Korean independence, Leo A. Bergholz, the American Consul General in Seoul, made a request to all of the American missionaries in Korea that they refrain from intervening in Korean domestic issues, especially political issues.32 The only foreign missionary who knew of the independence movement before it really broke out was Frank W. Schofield, a Canadian and a doctor at the Severance Hospital.
Schofield received a visit from two of the Koreans involved in planning the independence movement before it broke out, but he advised them to abandon their plans because in his view there was little chance of success.33 Many American missionaries in Korea at the time had a general feeling that something might happen but were nonetheless very surprised by the actual outbreak of the March First Movement.34 After the March First Movement started, many Japanese newspapers published articles suggesting that American missionaries in Korea had incited the resistance. At the same time, however, Roland S. Morris, the American ambassador in Japan, reported to the Department of State that the March First Movement was directly rooted in Korean nationalism.35

The Government-General of Korea had to take into account the effect which any attacks against American missionaries in Korea would have, and in fact Sangai Kokubu, the Judiciary Director of the Government-General of Korea, issued a statement to the effect that the Japanese authorities had investigated rumors of American missionaries inciting Korean resistance but had found no traces of evidence, and that fixing suspicion on innocent foreigners should be avoided because it would cause bad feelings toward Japan.36 In spite of this statement by Kokubu, the American missionaries became more and more involved in the March First Movement. It was in Pyongyang that the March First Movement developed most fiercely. Moffett reported that the military police were chasing Koreans and using bayonets immediately after the beginning of the Movement.37 Sadie N. Welbon, the wife of a Presbyterian missionary there, wrote to her friends in the United States in late March 1919 that there had been no change in the development of the Movement and the reaction of the military police toward it.38 In April, Moffett reported to Bergholz that the situation there had not calmed down.39

On 4 April, Eli M. Mowry, a Presbyterian missionary in Pyongyang, was arrested by the police on the charge of sheltering five Korean participants in the Movement.40 Moffett and C.F. Bernheisel, the American Presbyterian missionary there, reported to Bergholz in Seoul and Brown in New York on the court hearing in which Mowry asserted his innocence on 15 April 1919.41 On receiving the report, Bergholz met with Saburō Hisamizu, the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Government-General of Korea, and learned that Mowry had been arrested on evidence provided in confessions made by Koreans under severe torture, so he asked Hisamizu to endeavor to treat Mowry with respect.42 Brown, for his part, wrote to Mowry’s friends and relatives that he was
convincing of Mowry’s innocence. Mowry was subsequently sentenced to six months imprisonment with hard labor on 19 April, but he was released after appeal to a higher court. In the end, Mowry was given a stay of execution in August 1919, and he was finally fined 100 Yen in December 1919.

The reason why the Government-General of Korea arrested Mowry in the first place, and in the end did not find him innocent in the courts, might be that it firstly wanted to demonstrate to Koreans the meaninglessness of their reliance on American missionaries in Korea, and secondly wanted to show to the missionaries their determination not to condone any participation in the Korean independence movement. On the other hand, the reason why the Government-General of Korea gradually commuted Mowry’s sentence step by step might be that it did not want to induce hostile feelings among the American missionaries in Korea and in public opinion in the United States toward the Government-General of Korea and Japan. In fact, many American newspapers reported the process of the so-called “Mowry Incident” stage by stage, and some of them reported Mowry’s arrest by the Japanese authorities in a critical tone.

In Seoul, many of the participants in the Movement who had been injured by the military police were transferred to Severance Hospital on 10 April. Viewing the Hospital as a refuge for the participants, a military police corps came to the Hospital and demanded to be allowed to take some of the injured Koreans to their headquarters. Avison and other doctors objected at first, but finally agreed in the face of the high-handed attitude of the corps toward the Hospital. The Hospital then reported this incident to Bergholz, and Bergholz sent Raymond Curtis, the American Consul in Seoul, to the corps headquarters. Curtis made a protest, but the answer from the corps was inconclusive. The turmoil in the Hospital did not stop after this incident. And shortly afterwards, in Cheam-ri (Cheam Village), about sixty kilometers south of Seoul, the military police corps confined about thirty Koreans to a church and then set fire to it. On 15 April, the trapped Koreans lost their lives. Hearing that many villages in that area were being reduced to ruins, Curtis, along with Horace H. Underwood, a Presbyterian missionary in Seoul, and A.W. Taylor, a correspondent of the Associated Press (A.P.) News Agency in Seoul, traveled to the region and investigated the actual conditions there. Underwood wrote a report on “the Cheam-ri Incident” and the Incident became known all over the world. In addition to Underwood, the
American missionary W.A. Noble went to Cheam-ri a few days later to investigate the situation there, along with William M. Royds, the acting British Consul General in Seoul. After this, a delegation of Christian missionaries including Noble met with Governor-General Hasegawa, and Noble informed Hasegawa of the things he had seen and heard at Cheam-ri. Hasegawa expressed his regret and told the delegation that not only would the persons in charge of the incident be punished, but also that such an atrocity would never happen again. He insisted that no order to massacre the inhabitants of Cheam-ri and destroy the village had been given to the military police. But the delegation was not greatly persuaded by Hasegawa’s explanation, because by that point a further eighteen villages besides Cheam-ri had been destroyed.49

In addition to noting activities in Pyongyang, Seoul, and Cheam-ri, Presbyterian missionaries reported the development of the March First Movement in other areas, as well as suppression by the Japanese authorities.50 So the missionaries felt a need to react more assertively to the situation in Korea. Some of them tried to contact the Japanese authorities in both Korea and Japan. Firstly, nine missionaries, including Avison and Gale, visited the Government-General of Korea on 9 March, and reported that the real cause of Koreans’ harsh feelings toward Japan was the many inconveniences Koreans had to endure.51 After that, ten American missionaries, including Moffett, Avison and Gale, held meetings with the officials of the Government-General twice, on 22 and 24 March, and insisted that such things as Japan’s disregard for the original culture of Korea and discriminatory treatment toward Koreans, the causes of the March First Movement, must be remedied. But, at the same time, the missionaries declared that they had no intention of intervening in political issues between Japan and Korea.52

On the other side, two American missionaries in Korea visited Japan in April 1919, and another three American missionaries in Korea visited Japan the following month. Each of them met with Japanese Prime Minister Takashi Hara and requested that he take steps toward the reform of Japanese rule in Korea. Hara promised that he would.53 At the same time, U.S.-Japanese relations became strained as a result of various international events and incidents: for example, the treatment of the Japanese and Japanese Americans on the West Coast of the United States, Germany’s transfer to Japan of interests in Shandong Province, China, Japan’s demand for the insertion of the so-called “Racial Equality Clause” into the Covenant of the League of Nations discussed in the
Versailles Peace Conference, the Japanese expedition to Siberia, and American newspapers’ criticism of Japan for their cruel suppression of the March First Movement.54

As a result of the criticism toward Japan, some Japanese turned their backs on the United States concerning Korea and the American missionaries there. For example, an army officer in Vladivostok, part of the Japanese expedition to Siberia, reported to the Ministry of the Army in Tokyo that the Jews were forming secret societies in order to overthrow governments all over the world to make way for a reign of the Jews. He reported that the United States and the Bolsheviks in Russia were under their rule and that they were aiming at Germany and Austria, and he speculated that a riot in Korea (the March First Movement) might be a part of such intrigue by the Jews, recommending that the Jewish American missionaries in Korea had to be closely watched.55 Of course, there was no evidence of Jewish participation in the March First Movement and the report was only an expression of prejudice against the Jews and the United States rooted in anti-American feeling.

Under these circumstances, the American missionaries in Korea could not ignore the brutality of the Japanese authorities evident in their suppression of the March First Movement, and “No Neutrality for Brutality” became a common slogan among them.56 It was the Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America that paid the most attention to the development of the March First Movement. It decided to send A.E. Armstrong, the Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, to Korea in March 1919, to let him investigate the situation there. Traveling in East Asia for more than ten months, Armstrong arrived in Korea on 16 March 1919, consulted with many groups there, and collected a great deal of information. Arriving in New York in April, Armstrong met with Brown, Frank M. North, the Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Church in the United States of America, and William I. Haven, the Secretary of the Bible Society of the United States of America, and they decided to deal with the Korean situation at the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.57 The Commission held over ten meetings between 16 April and the end of July 1919 to discuss the issue of Korea. And it was Sidney L. Gulick who played a leading part in the meetings. Having taught at Dōshisha University in Kyōto and being pro-Japanese, Gulick met with Chōnosuke Yada, the Japanese Consul General in New York, after the first meeting.
...Commission and asked Yada to improve Japan’s policy of “Rule by Bayonet” in Korea. Yada thought that Gulick’s attitude did not reflect his long-time pro-Japanese position. And about ten prominent Japanese including Yada were to be invited to a meeting of the commission held on 19 April 1919.58

The Commission refrained from publicly releasing the information about the Korean situation because it thought that it would instigate anti-Japanese feeling. Receiving news of this restraint, the Japanese Foreign Minister Yasuya Uchida instructed Yada to inform the Commission of the Japanese hope that the Commission would continue to act cautiously, because Prime Minister Hara intended to improve Japan’s rule of Korea in May 1919.59 Receiving the message through Yada, the Commission held a meeting on 24 May, after which Gulick sent a letter to Yada on 29 May, stressing that Japan had to offer evidence to disprove the Commission’s information. Further, the Commission feared that American distrust of Japan would increase if the information were true and the situation in Korea were not remedied, hinting at over-optimism in the Japanese assessment of the situation in Korea and implying the Commission’s irritation.60 In the meantime, the Commission was receiving more pieces of information about the real situation in Korea one by one, and newspapers had already reported some of them. So the Commission could not delay releasing the information any longer.61 Realizing that the long-time pro-Japanese stance of members such as Brown and Gulick had led the Japanese to assume that they would adopt the attitude of indifferent bystanders toward the situation in Korea, the Commission decided to publish the information it received as a booklet in July 1919. The Commission sent a telegraph to Hara on 26 June, stating that the atrocities in Korea had weakened their goodwill toward Japan to the verge of a crisis, that the facts could not be concealed forever, and that it was very important for Japan to issue an official statement stating that the atrocities would end and that a reform of the Japanese rule of Korea would be undertaken.62 Receiving the telegraph, which was a kind of ultimatum, Hara sent an answering telegraph to the effect that he fully understood the request, that the Japanese rule of Korea after the annexation of Korea had to be remedied in 1919, that a plan amending the system of rule could not be carried out immediately because of the March First Movement, but that the plan would be carried out before long.63

In July 1919, the Commission published a 125-page booklet entitled *The Korean Situation*, although the information it had received would
have added up to 1000 pages if they had published all of it. They included thirty-four points in the booklet and the Commission wrote that the criterion used for selecting them was whether they were verifiable. But the one thing that must be pointed out is a section called “The Japanese-Korean Situation,” which said that there were two parties in Japan, the reactionary militaristic party and the liberal progressive party, and that Hara belonged to the latter party, which had to be supported for the sake of future reform of the Japanese rule of Korea and for liberty and human rights all over the world. This view is widely supposed to have been written under the influence of Gulick, because it reflected Gulick’s pro-Japanese stance. But this stated line of argument was questionable, because it was Hara who had ordered the army in Tokyo and the military police in Korea to suppress the March First Movement.

Under these circumstances, Hara, prioritizing U.S.-Japan relations, began to take steps to reform the rule of Korea by Japan. Feeling “pressure” from American Christian groups and thinking that the Government-General of Korea was within the sphere of influence of Aritomo Yamagata, the strongest elder statesman (Genrō) then in Japan, Hara consulted with Yamagata many times through the Army Minister Giichi Tanaka who was trying to bring Yamagata and Hara together. Tanaka was one of the “Yamagata Faction” and had ambitions of his own to become prime minister. So Hara’s wish to transform the “Rule by Bayonet” into “Cultural Administration (Bunka Seiji)” was realized by introducing a System of military-civil officer into the new post of Governor-General of Korea (Chôsen Sôtoku Bunbu Ryôkansei) and naming the former Naval Minister Makoto Saitô to the post.

**INTRODUCTION OF “THE CULTURAL ADMINISTRATION” INTO KOREA BY MAKOTO SAITÔ AND THE AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA**

When Saitô arrived at Seoul’s central train station, Namdaemun (Nandaimon, or South Gate) Station, on 2 September 1919, a bomb was thrown at his coach. Twenty-nine people were injured, but Saitô was unhurt. Some Koreans cheered the incident. Afterwards, Saitô went to the official residence of the Governor-General of Korea and told the press that he would not change his plans for reform. Hearing the news, many of the American missionaries in Korea criticized the incident because two of the twenty-nine injured persons were Americans: William P. Harrison, younger brother of a former mayor of Chicago, Carter H.
Harrison, and his wife. Saitô announced his intention to carry out his plan for reform of the rule of Korea by Japan on 3 September 1919, and in fact began to carry out measures to support the new “Cultural Administration,” by transforming the military police force into ordinary police, for example (although the number of ordinary policemen was greater than the number of military policemen had been), allowing the publication of Korean national newspapers (the present Chosun Ilbo and Dong-a Ilbo were first published in March and April 1920, respectively) and abolishing the practice of flogging arrested and accused Koreans.

The introduction of the “Cultural Administration” into Korean politics was ultimately aimed at preventing any recurrence of the March First Movement. Taking steps to introduce the “Cultural Administration” into Korea, Saitô tried to appease the American missionaries in Korea who might become the strongest obstacle for Japan’s rule of Korea. At first, he did not agree with former Governor-General Hasegawa that the Japanese should protect Koreans’ right to free religious worship. For a politician or military officer of the time, Saitô had a gentle nature, and could speak English well because he had worked as a military attaché at the Japanese Legation in Washington, D.C., from 1884 to 1888. So he felt he should let the American missionaries in Korea think that he intended to carry out a freer policy in Korea and that he had no intention of intervening in their religious activities; he met with Schofield in Japan on 29 August 1919, before departing for Korea. After meeting with Saitô, Schofield thought that Saitô would be a warm-hearted Governor-General of Korea.

Arriving in Seoul, Saitô set about appeasing the American missionaries in Korea. He asked the Federal Council of Presbyterian Evangelical Missions in Korea to advise him on the governing of Korea in September. In a letter dated 29 September 1919, the Federal Council gave Saitô many concrete suggestions concerning Christianity, stating that the serious issue at hand was not political and criticizing the loss of the freedom of religion and the brutal suppression of the March First Movement. Receiving reports from Korea, the Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America published Part Two of The Korean Situation in early 1920, in which it expressed its appreciation of Saitô’s measures. Saitô met several times with American missionaries over dinner in 1919. So the American missionaries in Korea had to change their views. Originally they had had no
intention of intervening in political issues in Korea (especially the issue of Korean independence). Knowing that measures were being taken to reform the rule of Korea by Japan (especially regarding the issue of religion) and the new Government-General of Korea was reacting severely against the participation of Christian groups with Korean nationalist movements, the American missionaries in Korea sought a way to cooperate with the new Governor-General. Some missionaries warned Korean church leaders not to take part in Korean nationalist movements and to keep aloof from Korean politics. Furthermore, some missionaries showed pro-Japanese feelings concerning Korea during and after the peak of the March First Movement. For example, E.D. Soper, a professor at Drew Theological Seminary in Madison, New Jersey, traveled in East Asia, including Korea, for seven months and asserted that the Japanese rule of Korea was inevitable because Koreans could not govern themselves. And Frank H. Smith in Seoul, the most pro-Japanese among the American missionaries in Korea, claimed that Japan had to rule Korea and that there were many lies in the assertions made by the Koreans in October 1919. He reiterated his assertion in 1920.

**AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA IN 1920 AND THE HUNCHUN INCIDENT**

The rule of Korea by Japan seemed to stabilize after the Japanese authorities forcefully suppressed the March First Movement and introduced the Cultural Administration. But in fact, Korean nationalist uprisings in and near Korea continued to occur sporadically and the Japanese authorities did not relax their vigilance regarding Koreans and the American missionaries in and near Korea. The American Consul General in Seoul and the American missionaries in Korea witnessed uprisings again and again after the introduction of the Cultural Administration and reported them to the United States. On the other hand, the Japanese authorities received a great deal of information about the allegedly close relationship in the uprisings between the Korean nationalists and some of the American missionaries in Korea, although almost all of the information was untrue. The Japanese authorities pressured the Baegje Missionary School in Pyongyang to remove the principal, Henry D. Appenzeller, from his position in March 1920, because they thought he could not stop the unrest in the school, for example the shouting of “Mansei (Cheers for Korean Independence)” three times in the
school and the mass refusal to go to school by the students. Finally Appenzeller was removed from his position, albeit temporarily. In 1920, the Korean independence movement intensified in the border areas between Korea and China, especially in the Chientao (Kantō) region of the Chinese side where many Koreans were living after fleeing from Korea. The Japanese Consulate in Hunchun, one of the central areas in the Chientao region, was attacked twice, in September and October 1920, by Chinese bandits hired by the Japanese authorities. Using this as a pretext, the Japanese government sent Japanese troops in to the area on 14 October 1920, with the pretext of defending the lives and property of the Japanese there. The Japanese troops attacked sixty-six villages and towns and killed about 2300 Koreans. Many of them were Christians, so the American missionaries both in China and Korea criticized the atrocities. But an army colonel, Takezō Mizumachi, whom the Japanese government sent to Chientao to investigate the situation there, told Japanese newspapers in December that the unrest in the Chientao region had in fact been caused by American and British missionaries there. Although the Japanese government declared that the so-called “Mizumachi Statement” was not the official opinion but Mizumachi’s own, the statement showed what strong suspicions the Japanese authorities had of foreign missionaries, especially American missionaries. Meanwhile the distrust of the American missionaries in Korea toward the Japanese rule of Korea did not disappear fully, of course.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated in the Korean Conspiracy Case, the March First Movement, and the Hunchun Incident, American missionaries in Korea refused on the grounds of their beliefs and humanitarianism to tolerate the harsh treatment of Koreans by the Japanese authorities. So they showed a kind of sympathy toward Koreans and reacted positively to the unsettled situation in Korea. And as the arrest of Mowry in the March First Movement was mostly symbolic, they reacted positively in order to prove their innocence as a matter of course when the Japanese authorities demonstrated any suspicion about the relations between the Korean independence movement and the American missionaries in Korea (or when they laid the guilt on the missionaries in order to avoid their own responsibilities). But on the other hand, not only the American missionaries in Korea but also the United States government judged that the
Korean problem had been settled by the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The United States had no intention of overthrowing Japanese rule in Korea, nor did they want a deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations due to the Korean problem. So American missionaries in Korea restrained themselves from reacting to the political situation in Korea.

If we think of their position in Korea as under pressure from the Japanese authorities, their reactions could be said to be reasonable. But their limitations can also be understood from the preceding discussion. From Japan’s perspective, the presence of American missionaries in Korea, which Japan annexed after paying a heavy price, might become a serious obstacle because Christians could aid Korean nationalists (in fact, churches in Korea sometimes did become refuges for Korean nationalists) and the Japanese authorities could not treat the missionaries as roughly as they could the Koreans, because of the importance of the U.S.-Japan relations. But neither the Japanese authorities nor the Japanese newspapers were able to dispel their doubts about the missionaries and their intentions. So as U.S.-Japan relations worsened in the latter half of the 1930s, Japanese authorities continued to put pressure on the American missionaries in Korea because Japan thought that they might become spies and could become obstacles in the way of the policy of letting Koreans become subjects of the Empire of Japan (Kôminka Seisaku), carried out until 1945. And under these conditions, the American missionaries in Korea had to withstand every possible inconvenience from Japanese authorities; for example, missionaries were closely watched, roughly arrested, severely tortured, and deported from Korea with empty pockets. In a sense, the situations in which the American missionaries found themselves from 1910 to 1920 prefigured their later fate accurately. But in spite of this historical experience, Christianity in Korea continued to flourish, through the end of Japanese rule of Korea in 1945 and on into the subsequent increase of American influence on the Republic of Korea.

NOTES

2 Ibid.
13 Henry Loomis to Brown, 5 November 1913, ibid.
15 Sharrocks to Midori Komatsu, 16 December 1911, ibid.
16 Speer to the Members of the Board, 12 July 1912, ibid.
17 Dunlop, “General Akashi and the Charge of Torture,” 15 January 1913, ibid.
18 Union Theological Methodist Seminary to the Missionary Secretaries, 25 June 1912, ibid.
19 Severance Hospital, 18 March 1912, ibid.
23 Numano to Kennan, 26 and 31 December 1912 and Moffett to Kennan, 12 February 1913 in George Kennan Papers (Library of Congress), Container 3.
25 Whittemore to Brown, 6 January 1912, *Korea, Conspiracy Case*, microfilm.
28 Chinda to Katô, 31 March 1915, ibid., 357–59.
31 Morris to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 8 March 1915, 895.00/587 and Morris to Lansing, 21 March 1919, 895.00/586, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Korea, 1910–29, microfilm (National Archives, 1962), no. 426, roll 2.
34 C.F. Bernheisel, Forty-One Years in Korea (unpublished manuscript), 74–86. I.E. Monroe to Loretta Parkinson, 15 April 1919, 895.00/611, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Korea, 1910–29, microfilm, no. 426, roll 2.
35 Morris to Lansing, 21 March 1919, 895.00/586, ibid.
38 Sadie to her friends, 20 March 1919, ibid.
39 Moffett to Bergholz, 7 April 1919, ibid.
41 Bernheisel to Bergholz, 8 April 1919, 895.00/628 and Report on the Trial of Mowry by Moffett, 15 April 1919, 895.00/623, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Korea, 1910–29, microfilm, no. 426, roll 2–3.
42 Bergholz to Morris, 11 April 1919, ibid.
43 Brown to the Relatives and Friends of the Rev. and Mrs. E.M. Mowry, 15 April 1919, Korea, March 1st Independence Movement, 1919, microfilm.
44 Hasegawa to Renzô Koga, Director-General of the Bureau of Colonization (Takushoku Kyoku), 21 April 1919, Gendaishi Shiryô vol. 25, 269.
47 Report of O.R. Avison, 11 April 1919, 895.00/628; Morris to Lansing, 11 April 1919, 895.00/595; Memorandum of Interview between Curtis and Sojirô Kojima, 11 April 1919, 895.00/624; Bergholz to Morris, 12 April 1919, 895.00/628; Bergholz to Lansing, 14 April 1919, 895.00/624; Bergholz to Lansing, 17 April 1919, 895.00/622;
and Bergholz to Morris, 17 April 1919, 895.00/628, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Korea, 1910–29*, microfilm, no. 426, roll 2–3.

49 Bergholz to Lansing, 12 May 1919, 895.00/642, ibid.

50 For example, about the movement in Seoncheon, North Pyong-an Province, see “A Brief Account from Synchun Territory of the ‘Agitation’ as it has Touched the work of the Church and the Christians,” Blanche I. Stevens to Brown, 11 March 1919, Korea, *March 1st Independence Movement, 1919*, microfilm. About the movement in Hamheung, South Hamgyong Province, see Rev. D.M. McRae, “Statement by D.M. McRae of Events in Hamheung, Korea,” 20 March 1919, ibid. About the situation in Kang-gae, North Pyong-an Province, see Rev. C.S. Hoffman to Brown, 4 April 1919, ibid. On the situation in Wonsan, then South Hamgyong (Now Gangwon) Province, see Norman C. Whitemore to Brown, 5 August 1919, ibid.

51 “Missionaries and Officials,” *North China Herald*, 5 April 1919.

55 *Gendaishi Shiryô*, vol. 26, 124.

61 Baldwin, *op. cit.*, 205.
63 Ibid., 3.
64 Ibid., 6.
65 Ibid., 6–7.
68 Ibid., 382.
73 Elizabeth A. McCully, “Notes from the Federal Council” in The Korea Mission Field (Federal Council of Evangelical Missions in Korea), November 1919, 234.
77 The Korean Situation, no. 2, 10; Baldwin, op. cit., 208–10.
79 Smith to I.R. Joy, 5 October 1919 and Smith to Gulick, 7, 15 and 16 October 1919, Korea, March 1st Independence Movement, 1919, microfilm.
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86 “Tai Senkyoshi Sotsû [Toward the Understanding of Missionaries],” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 3 December 1920; Bell to Colby, 7 December 1920, 793.94/1133, ibid. “Gaimu Tokyoku Dan [A Talk by the Diplomatic Authorities]” and “Mizumachi Taisa Katana [Colonel Mizumachi is Saying],” Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 12 and 27 December 1920; Bell to Colby, 22 December 1920, and 7 January 1921, 793.94/1156, 1166, ibid.
87 Ruddock to Colby, 18 October 1920, 793.94/1132 and Bell to Colby, 3 December 1920, 793.94/1146, ibid.
89 Ibid., 512–67.